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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
During World War II, the composition of the United States military encompassed many
diverse ethnicities that included Asian, Hispanic, African, and Native-Americans. It is projected
that of the 15,440, 000 Americans that served in the war, at least 500,000 were Hispanics, most
of them of Mexican ethnicity.1 It is not surprising that most of these Hispanic soldiers were of
Mexican descent considering that in the late 1930s the Mexican-American population in the
United States was estimated at 2,690,000.2 Mexican-Americans took part in many of the bloody
battles that extended from the islands of the Pacific, to the sands of North Africa, and the frigid
winters of Western Europe. Indeed, Mexican-Americans served proudly and honorably in the
Second World War; yet, it seems that for some reason their contributions have been mostly left
out of American history books and even films.
One of the most recent examples of this was in 2007 when renowned filmmaker Ken
Burns released his fifteen hour long series on World War II titled The War on PBS. Burns‟
exclusion of Hispanics in the original version caused an outrage, especially within the MexicanAmerican community. Burns stated that his series was not “looking at itemizing all contributions
of ethnic groups” because it was never meant to be a complete story of World War II. The series,
however, managed to include material on the discrimination of African-Americans in the
military and the internment of Japanese-Americans. Burns ultimately went back and added a
1

Ronald Takaki, Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 2000), 3; Bryan D. Booker, African Americans in the United States in World War II (Jefferson, North
Carolina: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2008), 330; Hispanics in America’s Defense (Washington, D.C.: Office of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of Equal Opportunity and Safety Policy, 1982), 38.
2

Raul Morin, Among the Valiant: Mexican-Americans in World War II and Korea (Alhambra, California: Borden
Publishing Company, 1966), 16.
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total of thirty minutes of footage at the end of three of the seven part segments.3
The fact that this omission of Mexican-Americans continues is an added dishonor to these
men and women that served in the U.S. military during this war. Much has been documented on
African-Americans, Japanese-Americans, and to some point even Native-Americans. In the
course of the Second World War, the U.S. Army assigned African-Americans and JapaneseAmericans into segregated units. The 442nd Regimental Combat Team and the 100th Battalion
were two highly decorated units made up of Japanese-Americans that fought in the war. While
African-Americans served mostly in supportive roles, they also had a few detachments that
participated in combat. Two of these units were the 761st Tank Battalion and the 614th Tank
Destroyer battalion, both of which had excellent combat records.4 Why then would MexicanAmericans be left out of the histories when so many participated in the war? On the whole, there
may be no clear explanation that could answer this puzzling question.
For the most part, Hispanics in the U.S. military were not segregated into separate units,
but there was, at least, one known exception. It is this particular story of a National Guard unit
from El Paso, Texas designated as Company E that has received minimal attention by historians.
This unit was unlike any other unit of the National Guard in that it consisted only of MexicanAmericans. According to the Texas National Guard, the purpose behind their creation in 1923
was “to educate, train and Americanize, and to create a better understanding among the Spanish-

3

Gary Strauss, “Burns Adds Hispanics in „War‟ Series,” USA Today, May 11, 2007, 3D; Lynn Elber, “Ken Burns
Alters WWII Film,” The Post-Standard, July 13, 2007, E-3, http://access.newspaperarchive. com.lib. utep.edu/
(accessed 9/22/10); Alessandra Stanley, “So Proudly We Hailed,” New York Times, September 21, 2007, E-1, E-20.
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American youth of El Paso.”5 In the history of the National Guard, this was the only time an
experiment such as this was attempted with respect to Mexican-Americans. Considering the
amount of racism that existed in Texas towards anyone who was non-white this was indeed an
unbelievable event.
Besides helping to break many stereotypes, the men of Company E would earn great respect
as National Guardsmen and would later be some of the first American troops to land in Nazi
occupied Europe. As monumental as these men were to Mexican-American history and to the
history of El Paso, their story, like most accounts of Mexican-American contributions in World
War II, has been largely ignored.
Although a few historians have discussed Company E, there are no comprehensive
histories of the unit. One of the first historians to discuss Company E was Emily Tessier Zillich,
who mentioned the unit in her 1958 Master‟s Thesis “History of the National Guard in El Paso.”6
Zillich offered detailed information concerning the formation of the unit and specifically
mentioned that it was created because El Paso held a large Mexican population. Zillich followed
through by then discussing Company E‟s accomplishments in the 1930s. Lastly, Zillich quotes a
military report that documented what happened to some of the members of Company E during
the Allied invasion of Italy.
Zillich‟s thesis, while informative and notable for mentioning the uniqueness of Company
E, is an incomplete story of the unit. Zillich makes the mistake of saying that Company E
participated in an attack in which only four men survived. This statement, as the study will show,
5

Texas National Guard, Historical and Pictorial Review; National Guard of the State of Texas 1940, (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana: Army and Navy Publishing Company, 1940 ), 59.
6

Emily Tessier Zillich, “History of the National Guard in El Paso,” (M.A. Thesis, University of Texas at El Paso,
1958). Microfilm.
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is false. While Company E did participate in this specific attack, there were more than four
survivors. Zillich‟s focus was more on the National Guard than it was on Company E and it does
not have the analysis of a Mexican-American history themed text. In the end, Zillich‟s thesis
serves as a good history of the El Paso National Guard, but would not suffice as a comprehensive
history of Company E.
One of the later texts to discuss Company E was a 1963 book by Raul Morin titled
Among The Valiant: Mexican-Americans in World War II and Korea. As a World War II
veteran himself, Morin grew tired of seeing how fellow Mexican-American veterans were still
being discriminated against. Moreover, he felt that their accomplishments were being ignored
from the history books and that the American people needed to know; thus, Morin dedicated his
book to the Mexican-Americans that served in these two wars. Thirteen of Morin‟s seventeen
chapters concentrate on specific individuals who did something extraordinary in a particular
theater of war such as the Pacific, North Africa, Europe, and finally Korea. Some of these men
earned the Congressional Medal of Honor, while others received medals such as the
Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, and the Bronze Star.
In his chapter of the Mediterranean campaign, Morin focuses almost entirely on Company
E. He gives a very brief history of the company with regard to origins in El Paso and their
journey from the U.S. to North Africa and finally Italy following their federalization. Morin also
addresses a few exploits of Lt. Gabriel L. Navarrete and the fiasco that erupted when Company E
along with other units of the division were ordered to cross the Rapido River in Italy. The rest of
the chapter is divided into two sections with the first centering on Mexican-Americans who

4

served with distinction in the 88th Infantry Division. Secondly, Morin remarks on a few
Mexican-Americans that served prominently in the battles of Anzio and Monte Cassino in Italy.
Although Zillich provided more detailed background material on Company E‟s origins,
Morin was able to provide new information in his book. In the end, Morin could be considered as
one of the first to attempt to write a history that credits Mexican-American military contributions
in World War II. Still, while Morin‟s book was enlightening, his account of Company E had at
least two known errors. First, Morin mistakenly discusses the exploits of a Sergeant named
Manuel S. Gonzales who he presumed was in Company E. Gonzales was indeed in the 36th
Division but was not with Company E. It was Private Manuel C. Gonzales that served with the
company and participated in the invasion of Salerno where he was killed in action. Morin makes
his second mistake by declaring that Company E was formed into a distinct Mexican-American
unit in 1941, which, as this thesis will show, is incorrect.
In 1982, the U.S. Department of Defense published a book titled Hispanics in America’s
Defense. Much like Morin‟s work, this text was written as a contribution not just to MexicanAmericans, but to all Americans of Hispanic ethnicity that served with distinction in the U.S.
armed forces. The text clearly admits in its introduction that was not meant to be a complete
history of Hispanics in the military, but only intended to provide a short summary of their
contributions. Although at first glance the text appears to be similar to Morin‟s, it is not. This
text covers a longer time period going as far back as the American Revolution and leads up to the
1980s. It even includes background information on the Spanish conquest of North, Central, and
South American territories. The text lists every known Hispanic-American who has received the
Congressional Medal of Honor beginning with Philip Bazaar of Chile and John Ortega of Spain
5

who both fought for the Union during the American Civil War. The text goes on to show the
thirty-four other Hispanics that won this medal in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Finally,
the text goes on to list the seven ships in the U.S. Navy that were named after Hispanics along
with all of the generals and admirals who have served in the U.S. military.
In the section discussing World War II, the text highlights Company E‟s participation in
the invasion of Salerno which is cited from Robert Wagner‟s The Texas Army: A History of the
36th Division in the Italian Campaign.7 While Wagner‟s text is also impressive, he does not
bother to specifically remark about the uniqueness of Company E. Wagner‟s text was focused
more on the 36th Division and so like Zillich, Company E was not his main emphasis. By and
large, Hispanics in America’s Defense is an impressive book and valuable addition to the history
of Hispanics in the U.S. military, especially with its section on Hispanics who fought in World
War I, which is a field of study that even today is almost nonexistent.
The most recent historians to make a reference to Company E in their narratives were
Rodolfo F. Acuna‟s Occupied America: A History of Chicanos in 2007 and Manuel G. Gonzales‟
Mexicanos: A History of Mexicans in the United States from 2009.8 While both authors vary in
the amount of detail they go into in each of their books, they share a similarity in terms of the
subject matter and timeline used to explain this history. For example, Gonzales and Acuna both
begin with background information dealing with a brief history of Spain and the NativeAmericans that inhabited Mexico before the arrival of Europeans. Their story then flows through
different topics including the Spanish conquest of Mexico, the U.S.-Mexico War, Mexican
7

Robert L. Wagner, The Texas Army: A History of the 36th Division in the Italian Campaign (Austin, Texas: State
House Press, 1991).
8

Rodolfo Acuña. Occupied America: A History of Chicanos ( New York: Pearson Longman, 2007); Manuel G.
Gonzales, Mexicanos:A History of Mexicans in the United States (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).
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immigration into the U.S. in the 1900s, World War II, the Chicano Movement of the 1960‟s and
other issues leading up to the present day.
When discussing Company E both authors cite Raul Morín, however, this is where the
similarities end between the two books. Gonzales mistakenly refers to Company E in his book as
Company Z which is incorrect. Moreover, Gonzales‟ discussion of Company E is just four
sentences, which is even shorter than Acuna‟s which was four paragraphs. In general, both
historians failed to mention any new information regarding Company E and like Hispanics in
America’s Defense these two texts were not intended to be complete histories but simply meant
to briefly cover certain issues involving the history of Mexican-Americans in the U.S.
Two of the most recent historians to publish works dealing with Mexican-Americans in
World War II are Richard Griswold Del Castillo and Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez. Del Castillo
collaborated with Richard Steele in World War II and Mexican-American Civil Rights.9 As the
title of the book suggests, its focus is entirely on Mexican-Americans on the home front. The
book has no mention of Company E and the only time that Mexican-Americans are mentioned in
combat roles are in an appendix page where both authors cite Raul Morín.
Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez has edited and collaborated on three major works dealing with
Mexican-Americans in the Second World War. Mexican-Americans and World War II and
Beyond the Latino World War II Hero: The Social and Political Legacy of a Generation.10 Like
Del Castillo‟s work, these two books focus on home front issues and not the military

9

Richard Griswold Del Castillo, World War II and Mexican-American Civil Rights (Austin, University of Texas
Press, 2008).
10

Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez, ed., Mexican-Americans and World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005);
Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez and Emilio Zamora, ed., Beyond the Latino World War II Hero: The Social and Political
Legacy of a Generation (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009).
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contributions of Mexican-Americans. However, one book by Rivas-Rodriguez that is quite
exceptional to this field is A Legacy Greater Than Words: Stories of U.S. Latinos and Latinas of
the World War II Generation.11 The book is divided into three sections, the military, the home
front, and the post-war era. The military section of this book contains brief introductions and
stories not only of Mexican-American men in the armed forces, but women as well. This is
something that has yet to have been done by any other historian. However, as remarkable a text
as this is, it only contained one person from Company E, Abner Carrasco from San Pedro,
California.
Overall, there has not been a historical text that has properly explained the history of
Company E. The hope is that the following thesis will accomplish what previous historians have
failed to do and that is to tell an accurate and comprehensive story of Company E. This study
will discuss the company‟s origins along with their heroic experiences throughout World War II
and after. In addition to their story, this study will begin by explaining the factors that
contributed to Company E‟s formation which includes the following: El Paso‟s growing Mexican
population in the early 1900s, the city‟s uniqueness in having a peaceful coexistence with this
population, and Mexican and Mexican-American participation in World War I.
To complete this study various secondary sources were used including those of Raul
Morin, Emiliy T. Zillich, Robert Wagner, and Hispanics in America’s Defense. However, it was
primary sources that provided a base for this study and helped fill many gaps that existed in the
history of Company E. These primary sources included newspapers such as the El Paso HeraldPost and the El Paso Times. Another source was a 1983 film titled The Men of Company E. The

11

Maggie Rivas-Rodiguez, et al., A Legacy Greater Than Words: Stories of U.S. Latinos and Latinas of the World
War II Generation (Austin, Texas: U.S. Latino and Latina WWII Oral History Project, 2006).

8

thirty minute film showed interviews of Company E members Gabriel L. Navarrete, Jose
Montoya, Alex Carrillo, Manuel Rivera, and Santiago Jaramillo. In addition, the Lorenzo de
Zavala State Library and Archives Commission in Austin, Texas provided a large collection of
military documents on microfilm from the 36th Division. The documents included battle reports,
award and casualty lists from the division‟s participation in World War II. Lastly, an interview of
Mr. Ricardo Palacios, Jr. who served with Company E during World War II. Mr. Palacios was
born in El Paso, Texas in 1922 and joined the Texas National Guard in 1939 at the age of
seventeen. He was one of the youngest members to have joined Company E and would attain the
rank of Sergeant before his discharge on September 17, 1945.12

12

Ricardo Palacios, Jr., interview by Jorge Rodriguez, El Paso, Texas, February 12, 2010; El Paso Herald-Post,
March 25, 1966, B-1.
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Chapter 2
EL PASO
Explaining the uniqueness of El Paso would not be complete without discussing the
history of the city first. El Paso originally began as a Spanish settlement in the mid-1600s. It
became an American border town on the far tip of West Texas after the signing of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in February 2, 1848, which ended hostilities between Mexico and the United
States. One of the clauses of the treaty acknowledged that the Rio Grande now would be the
dividing line between Texas and Mexico.13
At the onset of the California Gold Rush in 1849, El Paso served as a rest stop for
numerous travelers heading west and generating considerable revenue for the town. As it was,
there was already peaceful coexistence between the Anglo and Mexican populations living in El
Paso, but the economic prosperity only served to maintain it further. Although the gold rush
would end, this special relationship of peaceful coexistence would not.14
El Paso‟s population would continue to remain relatively small until the introduction of the
railroads in the 1880s opened the door for extensive economic growth. According to historian
Mario T. García, this turned El Paso from a town of 736 residents to “a significant railroad,
smelting, ranching, and commercial center with both national and international importance in
that it linked the south-western region with the rest of the United States as well as with
Mexico.”15 El Paso‟s quick growth between 1880 and 1920 left a vacuum for unskilled labor
13

Wilbert H. Timmons, El Paso: A Borderlands History (El Paso, Texas: Texas Western Press, 1990), 15, 98, 100.

14

Timmons, 103.

15

Mario T. García, Desert Immigrants: The Mexicans of El Paso1880-1920 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1981) 2, 3, 31, 13.
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that desperately needed to be filled and was done so by countless Mexican immigrants looking
for work and an overall better life. El Paso‟s location on the border was of great importance as it
became “the largest port of entry …and main terminal for Mexican immigrants.”16
The overall impact of this great economic expansion in El Paso was a vast growth in the
city‟s population over the next forty years. In 1890, the population rose to 10,388 out of which
only 2,115 were of Mexican descent. By 1900 the population was at 15,906 which then almost
tripled to 39,279 in 1910.17 By 1920 El Paso‟s population had risen to 77,560 of which 39,571
of these residents were of Mexican descent. Historians on El Paso emphasize that census reports
tended to be inaccurate at times since Mexicans, citizens and immigrants, were sometimes not
counted. Therefore, El Paso‟s actual population in 1920 was estimated at nearing almost
100,000.18
Another reason why the Mexican population increased significantly up to 1920 was
because of the Mexican Revolution.19 The chaos caused by the conflict forced Mexicans of all
classes to seek refuge in the U.S. The most critical years of the revolution occurred in the mid1910s, which had the conflict occurring heavily in the northern and central states of Mexico
causing a flood of immigrants to enter the U.S. through El Paso. During one particular week in
June 1916, “immigration officials admitted 4,850 Mexicans in the city.”20 Overall, Mexicans

16

García, 2, 3.

17

Oscar J. Martinez, The Chicanos of El Paso: An Assessment of Progress (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1980), 6.

18

García, 31; Martinez, 6.

19

Lynn Dumenil, The Modern Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920’ (New York: Hill and Wang,
1995), 242.
20

García, 40, 44.
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living in El Paso became the majority since they now made up over half the city‟s entire
population. El Paso “represented not only one of the first major urban concentrations of Mexican
immigrants in the United States, but more significantly the only metropolitan area in the
Southwest with a Mexican majority.”21
Ironically, despite how many Mexican immigrants made El Paso their new home they
were very reluctant to be “Americanized.” The term Americanization was used “to describe the
progressive programs to persuade immigrants to adopt the ways of their new homeland.”22
Although the Progressive Movement began dwindling after 1917, its ideals, such as of
Americanizing immigrants, still strongly lingered.23 García stated that one good reason why
Mexican immigrants were so difficult to Americanize was that, at the time, Mexicans in El Paso
“had only a limited interest in American society: to get a job, make money, and return to
Mexico.”24 Most Mexican immigrants had no intention of staying permanently in the U.S. due to
Mexico‟s proximity. Additionally, because of the belief that they would soon return to their
native soil Mexican immigrants “felt no strong motivation to discard their cultural traditions.” 25
This does not mean that attempts to persuade Mexican immigrants into adopting so-called
American traditions and values were overlooked.

21

García, 235.

22

Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc.,
1983), 100.
23

Link and McCormick, 100.

24

García, 106.

25

García, 234, 231.
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Progressives believed that educating the children of immigrants was the best way to
Americanize them.26 Schools could serve “as a form of social control over Mexican aliens,
especially children, and helped direct their loyalties to the United States and to American
principles.”27 However, some had more in mind than just wanting to turn Mexican children into
patriotic Americans. Those benefiting from the cheap labor that Mexican immigrants provided
felt that it could make their children “loyal disciplined future employees.”28 In other words,
besides teaching the Mexican children how to be loyal Americans they were also to be taught
skills for manual labor.29 School administrators in El Paso simply went along with the idea.
Nevertheless, the Mexicans of El Paso resisted Americanization in spite of all the attempts to
convert them.
An example of this resistance was expressed in a 1923 article in the El Paso Times titled
“Americanization Work.” The article was submitted and written by M.J. Garrett who was the
chief director of the Americanization efforts in El Paso. This work involved giving classes three
days out of the week that taught “aliens” English and instructed them in how to apply for
citizenship. Garret specified that there were two particular groups within the Mexican immigrant
population that were proving very difficult in Americanizing. First, the older population of
Mexican immigrants seemed to have no desire in taking these classes. Garret assumed that they
“were hard to convince” because Mexican immigrants believed that their overall “status” in the

26

Link and McCormick, 100; Manuel Bernado Ramirez, “El Pasoans: Life and Society in Mexican El Paso, 19201945” (PhD diss., University of Mississippi, 2000), 94.
27

García, 121.

28

García, 110.

29

García, 113, 116.

13

U.S. could not be improved. Second, the younger generation of Mexican immigrants apparently
only had “a desire to earn more money.”30 This was the same problem that the Mexican schools
in El Paso had noticed early on. The children of Mexican immigrants would usually only
attended school for about four years and then leave to find work in order to support their
families.31 Garrett‟s frustration towards Mexican immigrants was expressed when he declared
that “the question sometimes arises whether America is not doing too much for the individual
alien and requiring too little of him.” He went on to claim that European immigrants tended to
show more willingness to become Americans than Mexican immigrants ever did.32
Around this same time, the Mexican population of El Paso played a big role in the
prohibition election of January 1918. During the election, prohibition forces (drys) complained
that anti-prohibition forces (wets) were going to use the great Mexican population of El Paso to
win. The “drys” noticed that numerous Mexicans who had voted in previous elections did not
register or enter the draft when it began for World War I. Moreover, the “drys” observed that
with the activation of the draft the number of Mexicans claiming American citizenship for voting
purposes had dropped significantly.33 Overall, for the countless Mexican immigrants trying to
improve their lives and believing their stay in the U.S. was temporary, fighting in a war was the
last thing on their minds. But the fact that many did not register for the draft and refused to be
Americanized only increased the hostility towards Mexicans in El Paso. Historian Lynn Dumenil
stated that American nativists had a “fear about unassimilated immigrants in their midst [which]
30

El Paso Times, November 20, 1923, 3.

31

García, 113.

32

El Paso Times, November 20, 1923, 3.

33

El Paso Times, January, 8, 1918, 2.
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was increased by World War I‟s hysteria over disloyal hyphenates.”34 This hostility was vented
towards Mexicans in El Paso, but also to different immigrant groups in the U.S.
While El Paso did have its fair share of discrimination against those of Mexican ethnicity,
there was actually little or no violence ever used against them. Historian Shawn Lay stated
“those who had lived in the Southwest for a number of years realized the feasibility and necessity
of peaceful racial coexistence…[and] that harmonious race relations were essential to the
region‟s biculturally based economy.”35 The only major racial violence to occur was the Salt
War of 1877 which, in fact, did not even take place in El Paso but in the towns of Ysleta and San
Elizario. This was one incident and could not compare with the number of murders and
lynchings of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans. These acts of violence were common in areas of
West, South, Central, and East Texas.36 It was in these four areas of Texas that simply accusing
a Mexican man or woman of murder, theft, or any other crime could easily lead to their death
sentence. According to Neil Foley, “Central Texas was cotton country and its people were
primarily transplanted Southerners who had brought with them their particular history of
interaction across the color line.”37

34

Much of the violence took place after 1865, due to what

Dumenil, 242.

35

Shawn Lay, “Revolution, War, and the Ku Klux Klan in El Paso: A Study in Intolerance on the Border” (M.A.
Thesis, University of Texas at El Paso, 1984), 68.
36
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15

historian Arnoldo De Leon described as white paranoia of the colored races which included
Mexicans, Native Americans, and recently freed slaves.38
A great example that showed the strength of this relationship was with the rise of the Ku
Klux Klan. Beginning in Houston in 1920, the Klan quickly expanded with branches emerging in
almost one hundred towns and cities. It was estimated that by 1922 Texas had one of the largest
Klan memberships numbering over 200,000. Arriving in El Paso in the summer of 1921, the
Klan slowly managed to find local residents that were willing to become members including
Protestant clergy, police officers, and a few city officials. From 1921 to 1922, the Klan was at
the peak of its power having at one point 2,000 members. At the same time, the Klan never
attained the dominance and frightening reputation in El Paso that it had in other regions of
Texas. As stated before, local politicians, businessmen, and the city in general benefited from the
cheap labor provided by the local Mexican population. Certainly, they were not going to do
anything to risk this economic prosperity. More importantly and as indicated by Lay, “it was
precisely because the Pass [El Paso] was heavily Hispanic and Roman Catholic, that residents,
including a majority of Protestants, rejected the KKK.”39 By and large, the white residents of El
Paso showed that they were willing to protect the local Mexican population, even if it was for
economic purposes. This was something that, at the time, could not be said by other Texas cities.
As much as the role of El Paso‟s uniqueness might have played in the creation of Company E,
the following chapter will show that there were other factors occurring outside of El Paso that
also contributed.

38

De León, 87.

39

Lay, 101, 102, 103, 202, 223, 281.
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Chapter 3
WORLD WAR I & MARCELINO SERNA
Despite attempts to remain neutral, the U.S. entered the First World War on April 6, 1917,
for two reasons.40 First, in the previous month German submarines had sunk four American
merchant ships. Secondly, in January 1917, a message was sent from the German foreign
secretary, Alfred Zimmerman, to the German minister in Mexico. Although the message was
supposed to be secret it was intercepted and decoded by British intelligence. A copy was then
sent to U.S. intelligence, which “verified its authenticity.”41 The message was referred to as the
Zimmerman Telegram and President Woodrow Wilson permitted the release of the message to
the American public which specified that the German ambassador was to “make Mexico a
proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous
financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to re-conquer the lost territory
in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona”42
The U.S.‟ entry into the war brought at least two known changes in regards to MexicanAmericans. First, historian Arnoldo De Leon asserts that the war caused a change in how some
Anglo political and military officials in Texas viewed Mexican-Americans. During World War I,
“as war-related manpower shortages deepened, federal, state, and local authorities called upon all
elements of the Texas-Mexican community to join in” and assist in the war effort. This included
Mexican-Americans and Mexican immigrants. The amount of effort being put into recruiting
40
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their help was enough to convince many Texas-Mexicans that they were no longer looked at as
some “inferior race,” but as genuine Americans. In Texas, at least, Mexican-Americans saw this
as a great opportunity to prove their patriotism. This was a great change since Mexicans, both
native and foreign born, were characterized as being unable to assimilate to Texas and American
society in general.43 Although it is known that Mexican-Americans served in the war, it is
unclear as to how many participated. Still, the number of Texas-Mexicans that served must have
been significant enough for the Texas government to notice since, De Leon claims, “following
the war, [the] government no longer looked upon them as stepchildren.”44
Secondly, for those Mexican-Americans that served in World War I, their experience
evoked a change in how they saw themselves. As mentioned before, most Mexicans residing in
the U.S. vehemently opposed Americanization believing that their stay in the U.S. was
temporary. However, many World War I veterans of Mexican ethnicity returned with a different
outlook about their identity. They now saw the U.S. not as a temporary home, but as their
permanent one. Serving in the U.S. military caused them to no longer see themselves as just
Mexicans, but as Mexican-Americans. These veterans were more concerned with “acquiring
U.S. citizenship and becoming Mexican American than they were with maintaining the Mexican
culture.”45 This ideology brought back by these veterans spread throughout the 1920s and
“contributed to a growing sense that Mexican-Americans were citizens and equals.”46 This
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forced many Mexicans living in the U.S. to come to the understanding that they would never be
returning to Mexico as they always believed. With Texas having the largest population of ethnic
Mexicans, it was here that this new identity spread the most, especially among the youth. 47
While the number of ethnic Mexicans that served in World War I is unknown, there is one
record of a Mexican national serving with distinction, Marcelino Serna, a Mexican immigrant
who served honorably as a private in the United States Army.48 Serna was born in 1896 in the
state of Chihuahua, and like countless Mexican immigrants before him, came to the U.S.
searching for work and a better life.49 In 1916, Serna immigrated to the U.S. living in El Paso
for a brief time before finding work with the railroads in Kansas. One year later, Serna moved to
Colorado where he found work picking sugar beets. The work was arduous and required one to
constantly crouch down in order to pick the sugar beets.50
Serna‟s time as a laborer, however, would be short lived since he volunteered for the Army
in 1917 soon after the U.S. entered the war. Although he had registered for the draft in Colorado,
Serna was held by federal authorities in Denver due to a mix up with the local draft board. For
several days Serna waited for his draft classification, but it never came. Discouraged, Serna told
federal authorities that he wanted to volunteer for the army instead.51 While not yet a U.S.
citizen, the “Selective Service regulations allowed draft boards to conscript immigrants from
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nonenemy nations who had completed the necessary paperwork, but were still in the 5-year
waiting period.”52 Serna was processed at Fort Morgan in Colorado where he completed all of
the necessary paperwork before he could officially serve in the U.S. Army. Upon being
processed and receiving his uniform, Serna was transferred to Camp Funston, Kansas where he
was assigned to Company B, 335th Infantry Regiment, 89th Division.53 During training in
Kansas, Serna was regarded as an excellent marksman and was selected to be the company
scout.54 After training for almost a month, Serna along with thousands of other American
soldiers, were sent to the grisly battlefields of Europe.55
Serna‟s earliest act of bravery came during his first battle at St. Mihiel, France in July
1918. During one particular engagement, Serna‟s “unit was pinned under heavy German
machine gun fire.”56 After thirteen of his friends were cut down, Serna realized that something
needed to be done before the rest of the company suffered the same fate. He took it upon himself
to act by asking the company commander permission to search for and destroy the machine gun
nests that were slaying his comrades.57 Amazingly, as Serna charged one of the machine gun
nests he felt two bullets hit his helmet that luckily failed to wound him. In spite of the continuous
heavy fire, Serna successfully managed to get within close distance of the bunker.58 In an
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interview done in 1978, Serna stated, “I crawled to about 50 feet and began throwing hand
grenades at the pit.”59 The blasts from the grenades instantly killed of the six German soldiers
inside and was followed by the surrender of eight other Germans that Serna took prisoner.60
Serna‟s second act of courage also occurred while in the St. Mihiel sector on September
12, 1918. While on patrol duty, Serna spotted a German sniper walking along a trench. The
sniper had was unaware that he was being watched by Serna. While the sniper was over 300
yards away, Serna‟s skill as a marksman came into play. Serna took aim and fired at the sniper,
but only wounded him. The sniper, who turned out to be an equally skilled marksman, shot back
at Serna “grazing him slightly on the head” and giving him enough time to escape.61 Serna,
however, tracked down the wounded German by following his blood trail which led to a trench
containing several German soldiers. Serna began firing and throwing grenades into the trench
killing sixteen Germans. The unexpected, happened when suddenly twenty-four Germans came
out of the trench and surrendered to Serna who marched them a mile and a half back to American
lines.62
For his brave actions during that engagement, Serna was given the Distinguished Service
Cross later that month.63 Presenting Serna with the medal was none other than the commanding
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general of U.S. forces in Europe, General John J. Pershing.64 Interestingly, Pershing who had
been assigned in 1916 to lead to the Punitive Expedition into Mexico to capture Pancho Villa
was now placing a medal on an American soldier of Mexican descent.65 Serna‟s award citation
stated that “PVT. Serna displayed exceptional coolness and courage in single-handedly charging
and capturing 24 Germans.”66 Serna also received the Victory Medal and two Purple Hearts.67
In addition, to the U.S. medals he earned, Serna was also given medals from foreign countries,
such as the British Medal of Honor, the French Croix de Guerre, and the Italian Cross of Merit.68
However, the one medal that many argue Serna deserved and was eligible for was the
highest decoration that can be given in the U.S. military which is the Medal of Honor.69 Initially,
Serna recalled being told that he was denied the Medal of Honor because he was only at the rank
of private.70 Serna‟s supporters, however, argue that he was rejected because he was of Mexican
ethnicity.71 Despite not receiving the Medal of Honor, Serna went on to serve in the U.S. Army
until his discharge in 1919. Afterwards, Serna moved to El Paso where he proudly became a U.S.
citizen in 1924.72 Clearly, Marcelino Serna‟s brave actions in World War I proved that
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Mexicans, whether immigrant or citizen, could fight and were not the draft dodging cowards they
had been labeled.
In addition, World War I saw the first time that the U.S. Army segregated soldiers of
Mexican ethnicity, but not for any factor having to do with race. The reason behind this
segregation had to do more with the language barrier and it was done on a large scale with other
ethnic groups. A significant problem had arose in the U.S. military during the war, especially in
the army, in that there were countless draftees who, like Serna, were immigrants with little or no
knowledge in the English language. Unlike Serna, however, thousands of these soldiers could not
complete their training because of their insufficiency in English. In the early months of 1918, in
what was called the “Camp Gordon Plan,” several military camps were chosen to specifically
train non-English speaking soldiers in their native language. 73 The “Camp Gordon Plan” came
about only after other camps had successful experiments grouping together soldiers who spoke
the same language with others who were bilingual. One such experiment occurred in the 77th
Infantry Division which received numerous draftees from New York City. These draftees were
from various nationalities and “had only elementary English skills.”74 At first, officers found it
nearly impossible to train these men since they could not understand the orders being given to
them. To help solve the problem one of the companies in the division organized themselves
according to their language. The result was that “when an English command was given, each
corporal could quickly translate it to their squad in time for the men to perform the required
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maneuver.”75 The bilingual troops not only translated orders but often tutored their non-English
speaking comrades.76
The success of these non-official training programs convinced the War Department to test
this method on a large scale in Camp Gordon, Georgia. Soon after seeing its success there, the
War Department authorized the creation of thirty-five camps that followed the same training
methods that had worked so well in Camp Gordon.77 Considering the large Mexican population
in the Southwest, the majority of “Hispanic draftees” were sent to train at Camp Cody, which
was near Deming, New Mexico. As helpful as the Camp Gordon Plan appeared, it had its
drawbacks in that the “training took too long and few saw combat as a result.”78 The military
realized that something better needed to be done if another major war were to erupt.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, El Paso had a vastly growing Mexican population
that resisted being Americanized. Thus, an idea came even before the U.S. entered World War I,
when supporters of Americanization felt that military service for immigrants provided a great
tool to “Americanize the unwashed masses…and implant or reinforce the middle –class virtues
of personal hygiene, efficiency, chastity, sobriety, and patriotism.”79 One of the earliest efforts to
do this was started by the U.S. Navy in 1913. Details are scarce as to how the navy did this, but it
is known that immigrant recruits were given an education in different subjects including history,
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geography, and mathematics. In addition, they were also taught reading and writing skills. In the
end, all of these events combined may have played significant roles in influencing the Texas
National Guard to create a unit in El Paso that consisted only of Mexican-Americans. This was
not only because the growing Mexican-American population provided a great future source of
military manpower, but it may have also offered a way to reach out to that particular community
and Americanize it. The chance to attempt such an experiment would come soon after the end of
World War I.
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Chapter 4
THE COMPANY E EXPERIMENT
On October 15, 1923, Colonel P.A. Wetherred, chief of staff of the 36th Infantry Division,
and Colonel Will Jackson, commander of the 141st Infantry Regiment, announced that a new
infantry company of the Texas National Guard was to be formed in El Paso. This resolution
came after Wetherred decided that Company E of San Angelo would be changed from an
infantry company to a cavalry unit. Furthermore, adding a third infantry company to the two
National Guard companies in El Paso would make them into a complete battalion. Wetherred,
however, decided and specified that the new Company E would consist only of MexicanAmericans.80
To help in the overall recruiting process of the new company Major Hugh M. Shannon,
commander of the 2nd Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment placed Lt. Harley D. Hughes in charge
of the organizational process. Hughes probably knew that he would need help reaching out to the
Mexican community in El Paso; therefore, he acquired the assistance of First Sergeant Saul O.
Paredes who not only was Mexican-American, but grew up in El Paso.81 State authorities gave
Hughes and Paredes a fixed time limit to obtain the quota needed to complete the new company.
It is possible that some members of the Texas state government did not want or did not believe
that the quota would be met to complete this new company of strictly Mexican-American
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personnel. On November 3, Hughes and Paredes succeeded in their task and finished their
recruitment drive on well before their time limit expired.82
On November 21, 1923, the Texas state and federal government formally accepted
Company E as part of the 141st Infantry Regiment of the Texas National Guard‟s 36th Division.83
Immediately after its organization Hughes was promoted to Captain and served in Company E
along with Paredes as its First Sergeant.84 Company E‟s other first commanding officers were
First Lieutenant Charles L. Ballard and Second Lieutenant James E. Powell.85 Their induction
and federalization ceremony involved an inspection that was held that night at the National
Guard armory in what is now downtown El Paso. The inspection was done by military officers
representing the federal and state governments. Representing the state was Captain Joseph
Johnson of the Adjutant General‟s department in Austin and representing the federal government
was Major Berkeley Merchant of the 8th cavalry.86
On June 10, 1937, the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 141st Infantry, Major Hugh M.
Shannon announced that he was retiring after fifteen years of service in the National Guard.
Replacing Shannon was Major P.M. Hart of San Antonio. According to historian Emily T.
Zillich, rumors soon began that not only worried the men of Company E, but also the citizens of
El Paso. One rumor was that Major Hart was going to dissolve the National Guard units of El
Paso and move them to other parts of Texas. The purpose behind this was that certain high
82
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ranking members of the Texas National Guard did not like the fact that Company E was made up
entirely of Mexican-Americans and were looking forward in permanently disbanding the
company. It is uncertain whether there was any truth to these rumors, but what was certain was
that many El Pasoans were not pleased at what might happen if Major Hart took command. What
happened next was incredible and holds to the uniqueness of El Paso. Zillich declared that due to
“the effort of the newspaper editors, other prominent El Paso citizens, and the military affairs
committee of the Chamber of Commerce, the transfer did not take place.”87 To avoid any further
problems, the Texas National Guard also decided to replace Major Hart with Major Douglas N.
Lawley as the new commanding officer. Not only was the future of Company E secured, but also
that of the National Guard in El Paso.88
The spectacle around this incident would soon be overshadowed by events taking place in
Europe and Asia. Imperial Japan had started a campaign of expansion in when it invaded
Manchuria 1931 and then Northern China in 1937. On September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany
invaded Poland, forcing Britain and France, which had vowed to defend Poland, to declare war
on Germany. On May 10, 1940, German forces invaded Belgium, Holland, and France. Within
days Holland surrendered and Belgium held on until May 25. Paris fell into German hands on
June 14 and two days later French forces asked for an armistice which took effect on June 25.
Britain was the only non-neutral country in Western Europe that stood unoccupied by the
Germans.89 On July 14, 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt mobilized National Guard units
87

Zillich, 84; El Paso Herald-Post, June 10, 1937, 9.

88

Zillich, 84.

89

B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G. P. Putnam‟s Son‟s, 1970), 206, 3, 65, 67, 77,
85, 86.

28

from thirteen states totaling 50,000 men. It was considered the country‟s first “step to a
compulsory military training program that would put nearly 2,000,000 men under arms by
October 1941.”90 Two months later in September, 1940, Imperial Japan signed the Tripartite
Pact which allied it with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.91 Although many in the U.S. wanted to
stay out of the war, it seemed that that possibility was slowly disappearing.
While the 36th Division was still not officially mobilized, they were scheduled to have
combat maneuvers in Craven, Louisiana, with other units of the U.S. Army from August 3 to the
21.92 It was not until November 25, 1940, the three units of El Paso, totaling 190 men, were
mobilized and inducted into federal service. Now they would shift their training from one night a
week as guardsmen to eight hours a day as standard army soldiers.93 Before, the company met a
few hours “each Monday night for drills and technical training.”94 Besides meeting locally, the
36th Division held summer exercises every year which Company E and the rest of the Texas
National Guard attended.95 Now, however, these men would be leaving their regular civilian
jobs to be full-time soldiers and begin training for actual combat. Ironically, many of the soldiers
along with their families felt that the odds of the U.S. entering the war were very slim. Therefore,
most of the guardsmen felt that this was just another level of training that would “do them a lot
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of good.”96 Company E was not the only El Paso unit that was part of the Texas National Guard.
There was also the Headquarters Company and Company H.97 Company E was designated as a
rifle company while Company H was a heavy weapons unit. While Company E reported at full
strength of 83 men, Company H reported only having 73 men due to the fact that “some
guardsmen with dependents were discharged.”98
Two of the city‟s local newspapers, The El Paso Times and the El Paso Herald-Post,
reported that at least ten students from the College of Mines, now known as the University of
Texas at El Paso, withdrew in order to enter the El Paso National Guard. One of these students,
Antonio Provencio, was a member of Company E. The college gave a full refund of their tuition
and the students were given lee-way in order to “re-enter college without penalty after serving
their one year in training.”99
On the day of the induction, the men mostly tried on uniforms and had their finger prints
taken. After their induction, the men were told that they would not leave El Paso for training
until December 4, giving them more time to spend time with their families. However, due to an
unknown delay, the units did not leave El Paso until January 2, 1941.The destination of these
units was Camp Bowie which was located in central Texas.100 Unfortunately, Company E would
be leaving without the man who helped form them seventeen years earlier, First Sgt. Saul O.
Paredes. Although it is unclear if he voluntarily retired or was forced to leave because of his age,
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Paredes was no longer in the National Guard after eighteen years of service. Replacing Paredes
was fellow Company E member Sgt. Lorenzo M. Luna.101
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Chapter 5
THE TRAINING
Camp Bowie was a brand new facility, built in September 1940, when “the war situation in
Europe caused the U.S. Congress to determine that it was time to strengthen the defense system.”
The camp was located one and a half miles from the town of Brownwood and with the addition
of training grounds the entire camp totaled 123,000 acres in size. From 1940 to the end of World
War II, Camp Bowie was “one of the largest training centers” in Texas and later in 1943 the War
Department authorized that a section of the camp be used to house German prisoners of war. 102
At Camp Bowie, the El Paso units joined the rest of the 36th Division which was made up
of three infantry regiments: the 141st, 142nd, and 143rd. Each of these regiments consisted of three
infantry battalions containing roughly between 900 to 1,000 men that were split into three rifle
companies and one heavy weapons company. A rifle company usually numbered up to 160 men
that were divided into four platoons. Each platoon then consisted of about forty men which were
further split into squads of ten men each. Overall, the size of an infantry division usually
summed up to a total of 15,000 men.103
Soon after their arrival at Camp Bowie, Company E was assigned a newly promoted
captain by the name of John L. Chapin. Chapin had received officer training while attending
Texas A&M. Between 1876 and 1963, the university served as a men‟s military college and
produced almost 14,000 officers that went into the U.S. Army during World War II.104 In 1936,
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Chapin had earned a degree from Texas A&M in Chemical Engineering and easily could have
served in the U.S. Army‟s Chemical Warfare unit, but chose the infantry instead. Like some of
the men of Company E, Chapin had been born and raised in El Paso, Texas and was very fluent
in Spanish. It is possible that this was the reason that Chapin was chosen to be Company E‟s new
captain. Historically, white officers that were assigned to segregated African-American units
tended to be from the American south. The reasoning behind this strategy was that the U.S.
Army believed that because these officers were from the south they “had more interaction” and
therefore, added experience in dealing with African-Americans.105 Perhaps the Army felt that
since Chapin grew up in El Paso and spoke Spanish, he was the best person qualified to lead a
unit comprised of Mexican-Americans.
Chapin and the men of the company quickly developed a bond of friendship and loyalty
that was immeasurable. Chapin became very well respected among the men of Company E
“because of his skill as an officer,” but more importantly because of the great lengths he would
go to help his men.106 As a form of friendship the men of the company had developed nicknames
for each other and only saw fit that Chapin have one as well. Because of his tall stature and
ability to easily tower over most of the men in Company E, Chapin was nicknamed “Daddy long
legs.”107
During the company‟s stay at Camp Bowie, Gabriel L. Navarrete and a few other members
of the company experienced discrimination despite being in military uniform. Navarrete recalled
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that after being promoted to the rank of sergeant, he decided to celebrate by inviting a few
friends from the company out to eat at a restaurant in Brownwood.108 After sitting at a table, a
waitress walked up to the group and told Navarrete “I can serve you, but I can‟t serve the other
guys.”109 Navarrete felt that the waitress had quickly refused to serve the other members of
Company E because of their darker skin complexion. When Navarrete asked the waitress why
she could not serve his companions her response was “Because they are Mexicans. They‟re
going to have to go around back.”110 Due to Navarrete‟s lighter skin complexion the waitress
had failed to realize that he too was of Mexican ethnicity. Yet, it was after he pointed that out to
the waitress that the restaurant manager came up to Navarrete and yelled, “That‟s right. You go
around back too.”111
Navarrete remembered that his friends “became very angry and wanted to bust up the
place.”112 Navarrete, fortunately, managed to calm the men down and told them that matter
needed to be handled differently. Although equally angered by the situation, Navarrete likely
knew that any destruction of the restaurants‟ property would not solve anything and would have
led to their arrest or worse. Upon their return to Camp Bowie, the men took the matter up with
Chapin, a man Navarrete and the rest of Company E knew they could count on.113
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The men arrived at Chapin‟s office where Navarrete explained what had happened to
them. Chapin became infuriated to learn that his men had been discriminated and discussed the
incident with a colonel at the base. Considering that this could happen to other MexicanAmerican troops stationed at Camp Bowie, the colonel probably wanted to quickly settle the
matter before any more controversy erupted. Navarrete and the others that were refused service
returned to the restaurant with Chapin and the colonel. Navarrete recalled that the colonel
confronted the owners demanding an answer as to why they had refused to serve them. The
colonel was given the same response that Navarrete received previously, “Because they‟re
Mexicans.” The colonel‟s reply was “No they‟re not. They‟re Americans.” Ultimately, the owner
ordered the colonel, Chapin, and the others to leave the restaurant. Although it appeared that the
owner had won, this was not the end of the matter. The end result was that “the hamburger
facility was placed off limits and the owners were later fined $500 for refusing to serve
American soldiers.”114
Unfortunately, like much of Texas, the area around Camp Bowie was a hotbed of racism
against anyone of Mexican ethnicity.115 Ricardo Palacios, Jr., a member of Company E, recalled
that a number of the restaurants in Brownwood had large signs saying “NO MEXICANS
ALLOWED.” Palacios further stated, “It‟s a heck of a feeling when you go from over here [El
Paso] and that‟s all you see.”116
As mentioned beforehand, the men of Company E saw their federalization as nothing more
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than a continuation of their training. In addition, their stay at Camp Bowie was supposed to be
only for a year or so and some of the men had already been discharged in November with others
awaiting discharge in December. One of these men was Gabriel Navarrete who learned that he
was to receive his discharge on December 10, 1941.117 Everything changed, however, on
December 7, 1941, when the Japanese navy attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in
Hawaii. The surprise attack resulted in the sinking of eleven ships, including four battleships and
the destruction of 188 aircraft. Seriously crippled were four other battleships and three light
cruisers.118 On December 8, the Senate and the House voted to declare war on Japan which was
followed three days later with the declaration of war on the U.S. by Nazi Germany and Fascist
Italy.119 Like the rest of the U.S., the men of Company E were shocked to hear of the attack.
Palacios recalled that after the attack on Pearl Harbor the troops took the training seriously than
they had before.120
Starting from their activation in 1940 to April 1943, the 36th Division was busy training for
war beginning with their preparation at Camp Bowie. Because the division was still at peace time
strength, draftees were added to all the companies, including Company E, during their stay at
Camp Bowie. But unlike the other companies, the 100 draftees sent to Company E were all
Mexican-American, with exception of the new officer that was also added. Most of the new
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members of the company were from South Texas and tended to be in their late twenties whereas
“the average age of the El Paso boys was 21 years of age.”121
It appeared, however, that many of these new draftees sent to Company E could not speak
English. Palacios believed that the 36th Division commanders purposely sent these particular
draftees to Company E because its members they were bilingual stating, “the reason they put
them as replacements to us [was] because we could understand them and train them.” When
orders were given in English the men of the Company E would translate to the new draftees in
Spanish. This resembled what had been practiced almost twenty years earlier with the “Camp
Gordon Plan.” Palacios believed that the military‟s viewpoint was that just because these
draftees couldn‟t speak English, it “was no reason for them not to serve.” Regardless of the new
draftees lack of English, Palacios recalled them as being very good soldiers.122 Twenty-four of
these draftees began taking night classes to learn English, which were being taught by fellow
Company E member, Sergeant Enrique Apodaca. Despite some of the draftees‟ lack of English,
the men of the company made a rule among themselves that only English would be spoken while
on duty.123
A training program called the “Louisiana Maneuvers” then began in which the 36th
Division joined eighteen other divisions that totaled nearly 340,000 troops. These maneuvers
were to be the “first major army versus army war game.” The divisions were divided into two
army groups, Second and Third Army. The Third Army was to play the part of an invading force
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that Second Army had to fend off. Besides using infantry and fighting vehicles on a large scale,
an estimated 1,000 aircraft from the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Air Corps also took
part in the war games. The pilots trained in dog-fighting tactics, but also in air to ground attacks.
Palacios recalled during one of these simulated air attacks that planes would drop bags of flour
on ground troops as a way to imitate dropping a bomb. Furthermore, because the maneuvers
stressed realism, troops had to make camp and sleep wherever they could. On one particular
morning a farmwoman was startled to find some members of Company E sleeping near her land.
When asked what they were doing, Palacios replied, “We don‟t have nowhere else to sleep
ma‟am. We‟re training to be soldiers [and] this is part of the maneuvers.” Upon learning this the
woman was quick to offer the men a cup of coffee, which, of course, they had to refuse so as not
to get in trouble.124
After the “Louisiana Maneuvers” ended the 36th Division returned back to Camp Bowie
and remained there until February 1942. After spending almost fifteen months at Camp Bowie,
the division was moved to Camp Blanding in Florida where they began their first set of
amphibious training.125 During their stay in Camp Blanding “the company lost a few of the men
from El Paso when they were transferred to officers training (OCS) and some went into the
Army Air Corps for cadet training.”126 One of these men was Private First Class Edmundo
Moreno who went on to serve in the Eight Air Force‟s 490th Bomber Group stationed in
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England.127 Moreno would become a tail gunner on a B-17 Flying Fortress where he earned an
Air Medal and a total of five Oak Leaf Clusters for “meritorious achievement” during the
numerous bombing missions over Nazi Germany.128 One of the award citations declared that
Moreno “showed courage, coolness and skill while serving as a tail turret gunner.”129 In another
incident, First Sgt. Lorenzo M. Luna was pulled out of the military. The U.S. Army had forced
him to leave because of some issue involving his age. Luna did not want to leave Company E
but had no choice in the matter. Some time later the U.S. Army asked Luna to come return, but
he wanted to go back “with his boys” in Company E. The problem, however, was that by this
time the company had already left the U.S. with the rest of the 36th Division. In the end, Luna
was reactivated by the Army as a First Sgt. and sent to the Pacific Theater of War.130 As was
done before, any men that were lost in the company for whatever reason were quickly replaced
by other Mexican-American soldiers.131
For Palacios, his stay in Camp Blanding was a much more memorable event that at Camp
Bowie. As mentioned before, Camp Bowie was located near the town of Brownwood where a
few members of the company were refused service at a restaurant because of their ethnicity.
While in Florida, Palacios stated that they rarely ever to had wait for a bus since generous
motorists would see them in uniform and ask if they needed rides to anyplace in town. The fact
that they were of Mexican ethnicity did not seem to bother anyone. On one occasion a dance was
127
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held at a nearby town and the soldiers were invited, including the men of Company E. Palacios
recalled that no problems occurred between them and the townspeople.132
By July of 1942, the division began training exercises in North and South Carolina in what
was called the “Carolina Maneuvers.” The following month, the division made one of their last
stops at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts.133 Soon after their arrival, Company E received a
surprise when they were chosen for special training. The 36th Division had received orders that at
least “one company from each division [was] to take a Ranger course lasting one month. This
training was given in the Ranger Camp located 10 miles south of Camp Edwards.”134
The Rangers were Special Forces units that were modeled after British Commandos. The
British commandos were created on the request of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who
wanted “highly trained men who were skilled in amphibious operations…to spread terror up and
down the German-occupied coasts of Europe.”135 Commencing in June 1940, British
Commandos began engaging in hit and run raids in numerous German controlled territories
ranging from Norway to North Africa. The U.S. Army soon realized the great capabilities a unit
like the British Commandos could offer and soon began creating Ranger Battalions. In addition,
they also realized that training regular army units in this fashion could increase their fighting
potential on the battlefield.136
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It appeared that the intent of this Ranger training was to make a mentally and physically
tough soldier even tougher. One part of the training that was given priority were the speed
marches, which were considered the “heart of the Ranger toughening process.”137 The speed
marches were a daily exercise that involved that soldiers surmount obstacle courses while
wearing the full weight of their combat gear. The result was that the soldiers undergoing this
training “grew accustomed to walking through fatigue and pain.”138 The men awakened at six in
the morning to begin their training which began by completing a 1,200 yard obstacle course.
While the course was only six-hundred yards the men were forced to run it twice. After having
their breakfast, there was a variety of training segments that Company E participated in. Some of
the more physical training included, “river and stream crossings …cliff climbing…weapons and
bayonet training, scouting and patrolling, small unit tactics, hand-to-hand combat…and first
aid.”139
On occasion, animal blood was thrown at the soldiers during some of their training
exercises. Although the men were never exactly told why this was done, it was believed that it
would help simulate actual combat and get them accustomed to the gore of war. Whatever the
reason, this was one part of the training that some members of Company E were not too fond
of.140 Map reading was another part of the training that was emphasized, but the men were also
taught how to use the stars to find their way at night. Palacios indicated that this was done in case
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the soldiers lacked a map or compass.141 The more specialized training taught the men how to
find and diffuse enemy booby traps while also being able to set up their own. Moreover, the men
were taught how to precisely destroy “bridges, buildings, tanks and machine gun nests.” Finally,
the men would end their day almost the same way it began with an eight mile run. 142
The fact that Company E was picked for Ranger training should not have come as a
complete surprise to them since “it was considered the rough and tough outfit of the division.”143
Almost from their inception, the “esprit-de-corps” or group morale was one of great selfconfidence and loyalty. Gabriel Navarrete once noted that for the El Paso members of Company
E, “not only were the men in company comrades in arms, they had known each other since
childhood and their parents knew each other. It was like one big happy family.”144 Three of its
members were actually from one family, brothers Juan, Andres, and Antonio Saucedo.145 While
the men of the company might have attended different high schools they had generally grown up
in the same area of El Paso.146 No doubt what helped some the men was that fact that many had
participated in sports while they attended high school. Even for those who did not play sports,
joining Company E quickly got them into great physical shape. Alex Carrillo stated that the men
became so physically conditioned that they “could outlast almost anything.”147
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From marching drills to their marksmanship training, the men took great pride in almost
everything they did. An example of this was in the long marches the company would do as
National Guardsmen. Company E started their marches at the National Guard headquarters in El
Paso up to what was then the city of Ysleta and back again. The roundtrip march was a total
distance of twenty-two miles, which they completed in seven hours and twenty minutes. Still, to
finish off the day the company competed against each other in a football game.148 In an
interview done in 1941, First Sgt. Lorenzo M. Luna stated that it was “the boast of the company
that it has never had a man fall out on a march. The men try to carry on no matter how badly they
may feel.”149
In regards to their marksmanship, Company E won the regimental championship eight
years in a row earning them the title of “expert marksmen.”150 Company E‟s marksmanship
skills helped their regiment win the Pershing Trophy twice; once in 1936 and again in 1937. The
award was given by the National Guard Bureau to units who achieved excellent marksmanship in
these competitions. During one national marksmanship competition, Company E defeated
countless other National Guard units to earn seventh place. 151
Perhaps the best marksman that Company E had was Sergeant Manuel Martinez. During
the 1936 divisional competition in Palacios, Texas, Martinez won second place. While Martinez
achieved several awards for other competitions he won, this victory was probably his finest.
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Presenting him with his award was Texas State Governor Miriam Ferguson.152 The eighth and
last competition that Company E won was in April 1941 during their stay in Camp Bowie. The
company won the regimental rifle championship when “ninety per cent of the El Paso unit
qualified as marksmen and 14 individuals were designated as rifle experts.”153 Whether due to
their intense physical training or unit pride, Company E was even said to have “excelled in
training exercises.” Gabriel L. Navarrete recalled how Company E “were [sic] known throughout
the division for being able to penetrate enemy defenses during war games.”154
After receiving their Ranger training, Company E rejoined their division to continue
exercises in amphibious warfare. This included loading from troopships onto the smaller assault
boats which were used to take the men onto the beaches to simulate an amphibious landing.
During this training many of the troops believed that the assault boats would drop them off right
on the beach, but usually never did. Upon leaving the assault boats the men often found
themselves chest deep in water having to make their way onto the beach while wearing full
combat gear.155 As the training continued into January, 1943, the men still did not know when or
where the U.S. Army would be sending them to fight. Little did they know that they would soon
be leaving the U.S. to fight the forces of Nazi Germany.
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Chapter 6
NORTH AFRICA
In April 1943, the 36th Division received orders that it was finally going overseas. Its
destination was North Africa where it would become part of the “newly formed Fifth Army.”156
The Fifth Army was under the command of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark which consisted of the
British 10th Corps and the American VI Corps. Each corps was made up of two divisions. The
British 10th Corps had the 46th and 56th Divisions while the 36th and 45th Divisions made up the
American VI Corps.157 Despite the fact that the 45th Division started out originally as the
Oklahoma National Guard, it received draftees from all over the U.S. It was not rare to find
numerous Mexican-Americans in the 45th Division from Arizona, New Mexico, and even
Texas.158
On April 2, 1943, the division boarded the troop transport U.S.S. Brazil and sailed out of
Staten Island, New York on their way to North Africa.159 Although there seemed to be no
serious problems during the trip to North Africa, Ricardo Palacios, Jr., recalled feeling uneasy
during much of the trip. At night every soldier had to be in their bunks below deck, but were
allowed to go above deck during the day. To keep busy during the trip the men of Company E
would listen to music, read books and reminisce about El Paso. On one particular day Palacios
noticed the ship seemed to be traveling in a zigzag pattern, but was unsure as to why. Finally, a
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Navy shipman answered his curiosity by telling him that it was a precaution against German
submarines that might have been in the vicinity. The zigzagging pattern would make it more
difficult for the ships to sustain a direct hit from a submarine‟s torpedo.160 The threat of
submarines was real enough and orders were given out to soldiers and sailors telling them not to
throw anything into the water that might give away their position. On one occasion a soldier
“was fined $15.00 for throwing an apple core over the side.”161 Moreover, Palacios and the rest
of the soldiers staying in the lower decks were told that if the ship began taking on water for
whatever reason the hatches in these lower levels would be closed in order to try and save the
ship, even if it meant sacrificing the lives of the soldiers staying at the bottom levels. Whether
this was an actual policy or not, Palacios made it a point to try and stay above deck as much as
he could.162
The 36th Division arrived at Oran, Algeria on April 13, 1943 and continued their training
for the next five months.163 Besides training, Company E occasionally took part in small unit
patrols, but never engaged the Germans in combat. Palacios, who lead some of these patrols,
stated that they would “search a certain area, but the Germans were already gone.”164 By this
time in the war the tides had turned against the German and Italian forces in North Africa who
were now frantically attempting to escape to Sicily with as many of their troops as possible. On
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May 13, Axis troops that still remained in North Africa finally surrendered.165 In their hurry to
retreat, Axis troops left behind not only men but also war supplies. Some of this included
German weapons and ammunition with which Company E and other units of the 36th Division
practiced first hand.166
Soon discussions arose between Allied commanders about which division would
participate in the invasion of Sicily. While it was proposed that the 36th Division participate in
the invasion, General Dwight D. Eisenhower and other Allied commanders deemed the division
too inexperienced for this mission; therefore, more experienced units were chosen and training
continued for the men of Company E and the rest of the division.167 Later, with the campaign in
Sicily succeeding, the question then became who would participate in the invasion of Southern
Italy code named “Operation Avalanche.”168 While it was suggested that the 34th Infantry
Division lead the attack because of its combat experience, General Clark chose the 36th Division
to spearhead the landings on the American sector of the invasion; meanwhile, two British
divisions would invade further north. Being held in reserve to support of the 36th Division was
the 45th Infantry Division.169 Out of all the divisions making the assault on Italy the 36th was the
only one that had not seen combat. The British 46th and 56th Divisions had already experienced
combat against the Germans and the 45th Division had even taken part in the invasion of
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Sicily.170 The men of Company E and the rest of the 36th Division were about to be tested
against the battle hardened German Army which had a total of eighteen divisions in Italy.
Protecting southern Italy was German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring with eight divisions, three
of which were Panzer (tank) divisions.
The Allies were to land in the Gulf of Salerno which was located in the Southwestern
region of Italy. Allied commanders estimated that there were at least 20,000 German troops in
the area.171 The mission of the 36th Division was to land troops a few miles north of the Italian
town of Agropoli and “capture main roads and push out to contact Montgomery‟s Eighth Army”
which had crossed from Sicily over through the Messina Strait to the toe of Italy on September
3rd.172
At the time, this was the “largest combined operation of World War II” with an estimated
450 vessels put together for the invasion.173 Still, Allied commanders knew that there was no
such thing as an easy and simple amphibious invasion and the plan to invade Salerno was already
offering its own set of problems. First, as large as the invasion force was, the 36th Division had a
limited number of amphibious landing craft to take the troops to the Salerno beaches. Allied
commanders knew there was a risk their troops could be overrun if there were too few of them to
make a breakthrough in the German defenses. Secondly, making matters more difficult were the
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reports that the Germans had placed artillery one mile from the coast and that “an Italian-laid
mine field in the Gulf of Salerno prevented convoys from approaching close to shore and would
be a hazard to the landing craft.”174 Allied ships wanted to stay out of range of any artillery and
were ordered to stay twelve miles from the coast. This meant that it would take longer for the
landing craft to reach the Italian shore, drop off the soldiers and return back to the troopships to
pick up the next wave of infantry.175 Overall, this meant that the “36th Division would have to go
in alone; and the follow-up forces would be slow in arriving to bolster the invasion effort.”176
The last problem involved the air cover for the troops making the landings. The plan
called for using fighter planes stationed in airfields in Sicily; however, because of the distance
between Sicily and Salerno, fighter planes could only offer, at the most, twenty minutes of air
cover. Anything more and pilots would risk running out of fuel before reaching the safety of
their airfields back in Sicily.177
In general, invading Italy would help the Allies accomplish at least three things. First, it
would force Germany to divert more troops to Italy that would otherwise be sent to France or
Russia. This was vital since the Allies were already making plans to invade Western Europe by
way of France in either the spring or summer of 1944.178 Furthermore, Joseph Stalin was
growing frustrated because he felt that the Soviet Union was taking on the brunt of the German
military. Stalin believed that opening a new front would relieve pressure from his forces.
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Secondly, Italy could “provide airfields for attacks on the heart of Germany, France, and the
Balkans,” since Allied bombing attacks were only being launched from England.179 And thirdly,
control of Italy would systematically result in “the Allies complete control of the
Mediterranean.”180
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Chapter 7
SALERNO
After having their final segment of training for the Salerno invasion in August 1943, the
36th Division “moved into a staging area…15 miles from the Port of Oran.”181 On September 3,
Company E and the rest of the 2nd Battalion, 141st Infantry boarded the U.S.S. O’Hara at Oran,
Algeria. Although the men of the 36th had trained for the invasion of Salerno, they had not yet
been given specific details regarding the mission of each unit. This was not done until September
5, when Allied ships were out to sea and there was no possibility of these plans being discovered
by the Germans. For the next three days the troops began preparing for each of their missions by
constantly going over “maps, photographs, and orders” to make sure each man in each unit knew
their objective. Before being briefed on the invasion plans, the journey on the convoy was a great
welcome by the troops. It was a one of the few times the men were given a time to relax from
both the strenuous training and the harsh conditions of the North African desert.182
The course taken by the Allied convoy “proceeded along the North African coastline to
Bizerte, Tunisia, and around the extreme western tip of Sicily, heading for the Gulf of
Salerno.”183 On September 9, 1943, the 36th Division began the invasion of mainland Italy and
the “men of E Company were among the first to hit Italian soil.”184 At 2:12 a.m. Company E and
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the rest of 2nd Battalion on the U.S.S. O’Hara began loading onto the assault boats. The attack
began at 3:30 a.m. with waves of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 141st Infantry making the initial
assault.185 However, American troops were not given the support of naval artillery before the
landing because it was assumed that the attack would catch the Germans by surprise. This was
an ill-fated decision for the American troops in the leading waves of the invasion force. Upon
landing at the beaches, they were met with a barrage of machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire.186
The first waves of the 2nd Battalion were Companies E and F which landed at 5:30 a.m. on
the left flank of the 3rd Battalion. Before the assault boats even reached the beach, the men could
see tracer bullets from German machine guns being fired at them. They were immediately
followed by the second and third waves consisting of Companies G, H, and Battalion Hq.187
Upon landing the men were met by German artillery that was “churning the sand” as they ran for
cover.188 Forty-five minutes later, Company E had fought and pushed their way 300 yards inland
from the beach. During their push the men of Company E were shocked when they were
suddenly engaged by five German tanks near the beach.189 The problem was that the “Allied plan
did not allow for any large number of tanks to go ashore in the early stages” of the invasion.190
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Attempts were made to have the navy provide artillery support but the radio operators on the
beach were out of range. In addition, support from Allied aircraft in Sicily was set to go into the
attack until exactly 8:30 which would take some time before getting there.191 In the end,
without the help of tanks and artillery of their own, the men of Company E had no choice but to
fight off the tank attack any way they could.192 If the Germans reached the landing zones, it
would threaten the success of the invasion and cut off any soldiers that were further inland.
It was at this time that several members of Company E took aggressive initiative to help
repel the attack by enemy tanks. One of these men was Sergeant Enrique Ochotorena, a native of
El Paso who had joined Company E prior its activation for combat duty. Although Ochotorena
and his platoon were initially further behind the rest of the company, he quickly moved to
engage three of the tanks, the closest being only fifty yards away. Armed only with a submachine gun Ochotorena saw a soldier that was armed with a bazooka. Ochotorena tried to get
the soldier to go with him, but the soldier appeared to be disoriented. Ochotorena, therefore,
grabbed the bazooka and began firing on the tank. The tank backed up a few yards in reverse
before becoming completely immobilized from the bazooka rounds. With nowhere to go the
German tank crew jumped out and surrendered, but the fight did not stop there for
Ochotorena.193 He and another member of Company E then rushed to find a safe position to fire
on the other two tanks with the bazooka. After finding a sand dune for cover, Ochotorena,
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“acting as assistant gunner, accurately directed fire” destroying one tank and forcing the other to
retreat.194
In another section of the beach, Sgt. Jesus M. Lucio had also helped repel the German
attack by using his rifle, which also served as a grenade launcher, to fire on the enemy tanks.
With no concern for his own well-being, Lucio ran over open ground to gain a better position to
attack the tanks. In the end, Lucio‟s efforts, combined with those of the rest of the company,
forced the tanks to retreat. Lucio‟s Silver Star citation stated that his “great initiative and
aggressiveness throughout the action contributed largely towards causing the enemy tanks to
withdraw, preventing a breakthrough in the company‟s position.”195
Private Raymon G. Gutierrez was another member of Company E who distinguished
himself during the invasion of Salerno. While trying to give covering fire with his automatic
rifle, a German tank fired at Gutierrez with its machine guns nearly killing him. One of the
rounds struck Gutierrez in his right arm and it apparently also disabled his rifle. According to his
Silver Star citation, the only things Gutierrez had left to fight with were a combat knife and one
hand grenade. Although somewhat defenseless, Gutierrez did not seem deterred from continuing
the fight since he managed to destroy a machine gun nest with what seemed to be his only
grenade. Afterward, a German soldier, who was possibly another member of the machine gun
crew, attacked Gutierrez. Given that Gutierrez had extensive training in hand to hand combat, he
was able fight off the German with his knife, despite being wounded.196
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Sometime between 7:30 and 8:30 a.m., after the tank attack was repelled, Captain John L.
Chapin regrouped the company to lead them further in when, again, the men were attacked by
five German tanks. It was believed that these were the same tanks that had attacked the company
when they landed on the beach.197 This assault, however, was part of a larger German
counterattack that consisted primarily of artillery and tanks all along the American sector. The
counterattack was meant to annihilate American forces which had not yet established a foothold
on the Italian beaches.198 Seeing as they had no infantry support, the German tanks decided to
fire on the troops from a distance. Much like before, the men of Company E “exposed
themselves to the dangerous task of firing directly at the tanks at very close range.”199 The lack
of infantry hindered the German tanks in that it left them unprotected and allowed the men of
Company E a better opportunity get within a close distance to attack them. A battle report
indicated that Private First Class Salomon Santos, Jr., Private First Class Abner E. Carrasco, and
Private Harold B. Beaver fought bravely and prevented the Germans from overrunning their
sector, in spite of being ill-equipped to battle tanks. After almost an hour of fighting, Company E
had successfully fought off the second tank attack that threatened the beachhead in their sector
and forced the Germans to withdraw more than 500 yards further inland.200
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Late in the first day of the invasion, Sgt. Gabriel L. Navarrete was ordered to lead a six
man patrol to determine the position and strength of the German forces in the area. Navarrete and
the patrol did not have to wait long before they encountered a German tank. They observed the
German crew exiting their tank giving the patrol the impression that the crew was unaware of
their presence. Still, the patrol hesitated in attacking with grenades until they were certain that
the entire crew had exited the tank. Afterward and for unknown reasons, the patrol got inside of
the German tank. It was during this time that another German tank appeared several yards away.
Navarrete recalled the incident stating, “We got inside the tank but we couldn‟t operate it.
Everything was in German, but there was a shell in the (cannon‟s) breech…We didn‟t know
what the hell to do. We took aim at the other tank and by trial and error, fired and knocked it
out.”201 As amazing as this accomplishment was, the men had no time celebrate and proceeded
on with their mission.
Everything was calm until the patrol was caught out in the open by a group of Germans
manning a machine gun. Without a radio to call for artillery or reinforcements, Navarrete took
out a small mirror to use as a signal projector; however, before he could even use it, a round
from the machine gun destroyed it nearly blowing off Navarrete‟s hand in the process. 202 As the
German fire continued, the patrol did the only thing they could to get cover, which was to form
and hide behind small mounds of dirt. Navarrete stated that, unfortunately, “I wasn‟t quite fast
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enough. I was doing that when a bullet hit the dirt in front of me. It slowed it down, but it hit me
in the middle of the forehead and was sticking out about a half inch.”203 The impact of the bullet
on Navarrete‟s head caused him to briefly lose consciousness. As he lay there motionless, the
men in the patrol believed that their worst fear had come true and that Navarrete was dead. Still,
the men had no choice but to hold their composure and continue fighting.204
As the battle persisted, the patrol suddenly saw another German tank headed towards
them. Much like the previous battles of that day, the patrol fought without the use of any antitank weaponry. As the tank approached them, a member of the crew came out from the safety of
the tank to fire on the patrol with his sub-machine gun. It is feasible that the German did this
because they had run out of ammunition for the tank and wanted to prevent any members of the
patrol from climbing onto it. Apparently, Private First Class Alfredo P. Ruiz saw this as an
opportunity and ran towards the tank firing his weapon at the German crewman. The unexpected
happened when “Private Ruiz approached so close to the tank that he was caught in the
camouflage of brush used by the Germans and pulled for about ten yards before being able to
break loose.”205
After regaining consciousness, Navarrete got up and flung a grenade that landed on the
Germans manning a machine gun, killing them instantly. As delighted as the men probably were
to see that Navarrete was alive, the battle was not yet over. With the situation only getting worse,
the men needed to find a way out before they were overwhelmed. Somehow, Navarrete
203
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succeeded in using an enemy tank as cover to get his patrol to the safety of a nearby stone wall.
After being pinned down for the next two hours, Navarrete finally managed to lead the patrol
back to American lines using some of the vegetation as cover. Following the arrival to their lines,
Navarrete was sent to the field hospital to receive medical attention and later shipped to a
hospital in North Africa. 206
The men of Company E were not the only Mexican-Americans that day that showed their
bravery. Sergeant Manuel S. Gonzales from Ft. Davis, was in the 142nd Infantry Regiment of the
36th Division. Upon landing on the beach Gonzales saw “an 88-mm canon firing point-blank into
the open doors of the landing craft” that were setting down onto the beach.207 Gonzales grabbed
his rifle along with as many grenades as he could, and under his own initiative began heading
towards the position of the 88-mm canon. The Germans manning the canon soon saw Gonzales
and began firing at him. As he threw himself to the ground for cover a tracer round from the
German machine gun hit his field pack causing it to catch on fire. Gonzales quickly removed his
field pack and continued towards the gun emplacement. As he neared it, there was a sudden
exchange of grenades being thrown between Gonzales and the Germans.208 One of the German
grenades happened to land near Gonzales which sent fragments of shrapnel into the left side of
his torso including his arm and hand. Amazingly, the wounds were only minor and Gonzales still
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managed to destroy the German gun emplacement by using all of his grenades. For his
courageous actions on that day Sgt. Gonzales was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 209
Unfortunately, two members of Company E were killed helping to fight off the heavy
German counterattack during the first day of the invasion. Corporal Manuel G. Gonzales of El
Paso, Texas was one of the casualties. Gonzales was attempting to destroy a tank, but as he ran
towards it he was shot “through the legs.”210 Wounded and unable to move, Gonzales was now
in the path of an oncoming German tank. Private First Class Tirso F. Carrillo rushed to help his
comrade undeterred by the heavy battle going on around him; unfortunately, despite his brave
attempt, the tank moved too quickly and Carrillo was unable to move Gonzales in time. Carrillo
nearly became a casualty himself and barely escaped being run over by the same tank that had
just killed Gonzales.211 The second fatal casualty was Private First Class Juan Pruitt of Pearsall,
Texas. During the German counterattack, Pruitt “placed his Browning automatic rifle on top of a
stone wall and maintained a heavy volume of fire against the enemy until his position was
located by a German who opened fire and killed.”212
As unfortunate as these deaths were, Company E was indeed very lucky it had not
sustained higher casualties considering it was attacked twice by German tanks and artillery. On
the whole, the 141st Infantry Regiment had a total of sixty men killed in action; one-hundred and
fifty wounded in action; and forty-two missing in action. Of these Company E only suffered two
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dead and five wounded. The names of the five wounded soldiers were: Rodolfo G. Acosta,
Librado A. Gonzales, Gabriel L. Navarrete, Rafael Q. Torres, and Marcelino Valadez. 213
Overall, battle reports indicated that Company E “played a vital part in protecting the
beachhead against repeated enemy attacks which possessed much greater fire power than that of
the infantry. The aggressive action of every member of Company “E” was instrumental in
keeping the enemy tanks from driving down the beach itself.”214 The following men of
Company E were recommended for citations on September 12th for their actions in holding and
repelling the German tank attacks: 1st Lt. James M. Humphries, 1st Sgt. Gabriel L. Navarrete,
Sgt. Librado A. Gonzales, Sgt. Carlos Irrobali, Sgt. Jesus M. Lucio, Sgt. Rafael Q. Torres, Sgt.
Marcelino Valadez, Staff Sgt. Enrique Ochotorena, Cpl. Santiago V. Jaramillo, Cpl. Benito G.
Dominguez, Pvt. Abner C. Carrasco, Pvt. Tirso F. Carrillo, Pvt. Juan R. Padilla, Pvt. Miguel S.
Garcia, Pvt. Alfredo P. Ruiz, Pvt. Salomon Santos, Pvt. Ramon G. Gutierrez, Pvt. Harold B.
Beaver, Pvt. Juan Pruitt, Pvt. Manuel C. Gonzales.215
Sgt. Robert P. Moncada would later state, “it was infantry versus tanks during the first day
and we hung on by the skin of our teeth.” 216 Sgt. Ricardo Palacios, Jr. indicated that they were
very lucky to only have encountered tanks, believing that the landings would have been more
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difficult had they run into infantry instead.217 In fact, it is possible that the invasion could have
been a complete catastrophe had the German tanks been supported by infantry. Ultimately,
Company E the weapons they had on hand to fight off the tanks which included “rifles, machine
guns, hand grenades and rifle grenades.” 218 Palacios recalled his thoughts when he saw the
German tanks and had no anti-tank weapons to destroy them declaring that, “the only thing you
can do is point your gun at the windows. May be you‟d get lucky and hit „em. May be.”219 These
windows described by Palacios were actually small rectangular port holes in the tank used by the
drivers to see where they were going.
The 36th Division remained on the front lines until September 21 when they were sent to a
bivouac area (temporary camp) near the town of Altavilla to set up a defensive position. For the
most part, the division was given time to reorganize and have a much needed and deserved rest.
While inexperienced, the troops of the 36th Division had successfully pushed the Germans off the
beaches and held their ground against repeated enemy tank attacks. The invasion that almost
ended in disaster was saved by the bravery and determination of individual soldiers like those in
Company E. The combat experience these men gained from the Salerno invasion not only made
them veterans, but gave them the confidence to know that they could win battles against the
profoundly experienced German Army.220
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Chapter 8
THE TOUGH PART BEGINS
As difficult as the Salerno invasion was, it would look easy when compared to what lay
ahead for the 36th Division and the rest of the Allies. The rocky and mountainous terrain of Italy
provided the Germans with near perfect defensive positions that made flanking attacks by the
Allies nearly impossible. All of the roads and passages leading north were well defended by
German troops in fortified positions. In a sense, the Allies were being forced to fight the
Germans in what would be costly full frontal attacks.221 As the Allies were later to discover,
their air power often “posed no threat to the defenders: established on and behind steep, rocky
hillsides, they [Germans] had no need to maneuver and required only the barest of essentials to
sustain their resistance.”222 While this group of German forces held the Allies, other units farther
in the rear could continue building up their defenses. This was especially in regards to their
primary line of defense south of Rome called the Gustav Line.223
The Gustav Line stretched across Italy from the Tyrrhenian Sea in the West to the Adriatic
Sea in the East. As the Allies would later discover, the Gustav Line ran along several rivers that
added to its defenses. Beginning from the west, there was the Garigliano River that flowed from
the the Liri and Gari Rivers. Finally, there was the Rapido River which flowed in front of
Cassino.224
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After spending a month recovering from his head wound Sgt. Gabriel L. Navarrete was
allowed to return to his unit in Italy. Navarrete recalled that upon his return to Company E “the
supply sergeant had given away all my (belongings) and equipment because he thought I was
dead.”225 Later that day, Navarrete was ordered to report to the regimental commander of the
141st Infantry, Colonel Richard J. Werner. Navarrete was shocked to discover that he was given a
battlefield commission as a second lieutenant. Ironically, Navarrete had applied three previous
times for officer training and was rejected every time.
As momentous as this should have been for Navarrete, in reality it was anything but.
Military policy dictated that by taking the commission Navarrete would more than likely be
transferred “to another company, maybe another division.”226 Navarrete told Werner that he had
to respectfully decline the battlefield commission because he did not want to leave Company E.
The company was filled with many comrades that he considered more as family than as friends
given that he had known them since childhood. This, apparently, was the issue that worried some
of the other officers. The question was whether or not “the men would respect Navarrete as an
officer since they had been through so much together.”227 In the end, Werner told Navarrete that
he could accept the battlefield commission and still stay with Company E. As a second
lieutenant, Navarrete was put in charge of 2nd platoon. The men of Company E, especially the El
Paso members of the unit, were proud to see that one of their own received a battlefield
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commission. Above all they were delighted that Navarrete was not being transferred to another
unit.228
On October 13th, the 141st Infantry Regiment was ordered to move nine miles northwest of
Naples where they would begin a training schedule and prepare for “Operation Tornado.” 229
The operation called for an amphibious landing farther up the Italian coast near the town of
Gaeta. The troops trained during the rest of October for this new operation until November 2nd,
when the 141st Infantry Regiment left to the Naples Harbor at 2:00 p.m. where they began
boarding landing craft. As confident as the men were there was no denying the extent of anxiety
the troops had about making another amphibious assault.230
Between 5:30 and 6:30 p.m., after troops had finished loading onto their landing craft, an
order came informing all officers and enlisted men that the landings were not to take place. In
reality, the entire operation was a plan of deception created by the Fifth Army Intelligence in the
hopes that the German would shift a considerable amount of their forces to Gaeta. Only a few
high ranking officers were told the truth about the plan including every battalion commander and
the regimental commander. Details about the plans were purposely leaked to German espionage
agents and even the amphibious training was done to make the Germans believe that an actual
attack was taking place. The Fifth Army Intelligence realized the plan worked when they
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discovered that the Germans had sent one panzer division to Gaeta believing they were going to
catch the Americans by surprise and annihilate the landing force. 231
Company E and the rest of the 141st had to remain in their landing craft until sundown in
order to keep the appearance that the invasion was still occurring. The men were not even
allowed to cheer at hearing that the landings were a lie because of the fear that the Germans
would catch on. After sundown all landing craft were emptied of troops and vehicles, but
proceeded to meet up with nearby naval escort ships moving north to Gaeta. Once there the navy
began bombarding the beaches with artillery giving the impression that an amphibious invasion
was imminent. Meanwhile, the 141st was moving to a temporary camp near Giugliano.232
The month of November brought with it harsh weather conditions that no military would
want. The rain was constant and, combined with the freezing temperatures, the troops had “little
opportunity to dry out clothing or to have hot meals.” Dirt roads became rivers of mud causing
vehicles to get bogged down. This forced the troops to carry supplies on foot to wherever it was
needed, even if it meant climbing up steep hills and mountains.233 An example of this occurred
on November 16, when the 141st Infantry Regiment was sent to relieve elements of the 15th
Infantry Regiment a few miles from Monte Lungo. After firmly establishing themselves, orders
were received specifying that at least fifty men from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were to organize
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“carrying parties to bring in a sufficient supply of food and ammunition to establish a dump for
the battalion in the event it was attacked and supplies could not be brought in each day.”234
Between November 17-19, the carrying parties struggled to climb up the muddy hills that
had turned slippery because of the wet and cold weather. Soldiers often lost their footing and slid
some distance down the hills. Making matters more difficult were the Germans who fired
artillery at the carrying parties. On November 18th, Corporal Manuel R. Rivera and Private First
Class Roque M.R. Gonzales were both slightly wounded during one of these artillery attacks.235
Unfortunately for Rivera‟s family, the War Department mistakenly sent a letter stating that he
was killed in action. To correct their mistake the War Department sent a second telegram the
following day to Rivera‟s family stating that he was still alive and had only slight wounds.236
For the rest of November most of Company E‟s missions involved reconnaissance patrols
and holding a defensive position against the Germans. However, due to the constant German
artillery bombardments, Company E suffered more casualties during this month alone than they
did during the invasion of Salerno.237 Tirso F. Carillo, Procopio Perez, Pedro T. Soto, and Ruben
O. Rodriguez were all killed in action. Listed as seriously wounded in action were the following:
Protacio Alaniz, Jr., Louis G. Cerda, Ricardo Gutierrez, Alfredo Lozano, Faustino R. Sotelo,
Abner E. Carrasco, Juan N. Flores, Eldon C. Harlow, Miguel Martinez, and Apolonio R.

234

Report of Operations in Italy, 141st Infantry Regiment, November 1943, Lorenzo de Zavala State Library and
Archives Commission, Austin, microfilm, 3, 4, roll 3027.
235

Report of Operations in Italy, 141st Infantry Regiment, November 1943, Lorenzo de Zavala State Library and
Archives Commission, Austin, microfilm, 13, roll 3027.
236

El Paso Times, December, 4, 1943. 1. El Paso Times, December 5, 1943, 17.

237

2nd Battalion Journal, November, 1-30, 1943, Lorenzo de Zavala State Library and Archives Commission,
Austin, microfilm, roll 3039.

67

Moncada.238 In total, the 141st Infantry Regiment had suffered two-hundred and seven casualties
during the month of November and the fighting was about to get much worse.239
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Chapter 9
SAN PIETRO
By early December, Company E and the 2nd Battalion were stationed on a mountain called
Monte Rotondo. Their positions were constantly subjected to artillery and mortar shelling both
night and day. Adding to the misery was the fact that the weather conditions in December were
becoming worse than they were in November. The daily rains caused rivers to overflow and kept
roads unusable for any type of vehicles. This even made it difficult for the troops to travel on
foot. Simple movements of troops and supplies became an exhausting and frustrating task for
everyone. Foxholes constantly flooded forcing troops to drain them on an almost daily basis any
way they could. Overall, field reports were indicating that “the weather and terrain was as
formidable an obstacle as the enemy.”240
On December 14th it was revealed that Company E and the 2nd Battalion were to attack the
town of San Pietro the following day at noon. The capture of San Pietro “meant that the outer
temporary defenses of the [Gustav] Winter Line had been breached.”241 The town was located
“on the southern slopes of [Monte] Sammucro…[and] the approaches to the town were made of
a series of terraces many of which were walled olive tree orchards.”242 Defending each of these
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terraces was a series of German machine guns placed in a manner to create interlocking fields of
fire; in addition, the Germans also had artillery supporting these machine gun units.243
Assisting the 2nd Battalion was the 143rd Infantry Regiment which was ordered to attack
the slopes of Monte Sammucro north of San Pietro. Meanwhile, the 753rd Tank Battalion was to
attack from the southeast of the town. The task of the 2nd Battalion was to have Company E in
reserve while Companies F and G made the main attack. Only after Companies F and G took San
Pietro would Company E be sent from the east to clear the town of any pockets of resistance;
moreover, Company E would set up defenses on the eastern portion of the town in case of a
German counter-attack.244
Company G was the first to move and immediately took heavy fire from enemy
machine guns and mortars. Company F was located on the left side of Company G and also
began receiving artillery fire before they even began crossing their line of departure. This forced
Company F to move farther down the line from which to begin their attack. Nevertheless, both
companies sustained immediate and heavy casualties during the attack including the death of
Company F‟s commanding officer and the wounding of Company G‟s 1st Lieutenant and
commanding officer. Company F tried twice to push forward but was repelled “due to the
superior fire power and excellent defenses of the Germans.” Both companies soon fell back to
the positions they held prior to the attack. Companies F and G were ordered to hold their present
positions and to reorganize as best they could and not to attack until further orders were given.245
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Five hours after the first attack, Company E was ordered to join the assault alongside
Company F. Due to the fact that Company G‟s heavy casualties had reduced it to two officers
and thirty-four enlisted men, commanders ordered the remaining troops to hold their position and
provide covering fire for the other two units instead. Similar to the previous attack, Companies E
and F only managed to get five-hundred yards before getting halted by the heavy fire being
thrown at them. Further hindering the companies from moving forward were the countless mines
and booby traps the Germans had prepared for them. Again, the assaulting companies suffered
heavy casualties with Company G down to just two officers and thirty-four enlisted men.
Company F had three officers and sixty-five enlisted men. Company E was down to just one
officer and fifty enlisted men.246
Since the daylight attacks proved to be ineffective, commanders felt that an attack at
nightfall would be a better option. The night attack began at 1:00 a.m. on December 16th, but
communication between the attacking troops and artillery units became severed. With no
artillery support, Companies E and F attempted “to storm enemy positions with grenades,
bayonets and whatever firepower could be obtained from…mortar squads still remaining with
the rifle companies.” 247 Against all odds, several men from both companies had managed to
fight their way inside the walls of San Pietro and destroyed a German ammunition dump. While
the U.S. troops inside San Pietro were fighting hard and even overtaking some German positions,
commanders feared that they were too few in number and too exhausted to hold off a strong
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German counterattack; therefore, the order was given to fall back.248 This was a mistake that
would later cost the American troops dearly.
The companies were asked to reorganize and prepare for a fourth attack before dawn.
Company E was down to forty enlisted men and one officer. Company F still had three officers
but only fifty enlisted men. Company G suffered no casualties since they were only offering
cover fire to the other two companies during the second and third attacks. Being held in reserve
for the fourth assault was Company L which was at full strength of five officers and ninety-seven
enlisted men. In the event that either Company E or F managed to push the Germans out of the
town, Company L was to enter San Pietro and quell any pockets of resistance still remaining.
Company G was also to remain behind but as a rear guard for the attacking units.249
The Germans used the break in the fighting to reinforce all of the weakened sections of
their line, including where Companies E and F had almost established a foothold. The result was
that in the fourth attack the two companies were completely overwhelmed and stopped from
reaching San Pietro. The German fire power was so severe that the two companies were unable
to go forward or back without the risk of being hit. Companies E and F were now stuck in
exposed positions and lay two-hundred yards from the town.250
Sometime around 7:00 a.m., troops re-established radio communications with artillery
units and requested smoke shells. This allowed the troops to get some cover, especially from the
German snipers that were trying to pick off what was left of the two companies. At 9:40 a.m.,
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commanders finally issued the order to fall back, but due to some miscommunication the troops
received the order three hours later. Even under the cover of smoke shells it took the two
companies three more hours to make it back to the safety of their lines “due to the incessant
enemy artillery, mortar, machine gun and sniper fire.” Still, the confusion and severity of the
battle caused soldiers get cut off from their units. A good number of these troops did not make
back to friendly lines until several hours later.251
The attack on San Pietro had caused the assaulting units to suffer appalling casualties.
Company E was down to just twenty-seven enlisted men and no officers. Among the wounded
officers were Capt. John L. Chapin and Lt. Gabriel L. Navarrete. During the fourth attack the
company‟s last officer was wounded. Sgt. Enrique Ochotorena then took command of the unit
and led them safely back to their lines when the final assault was called off. However,
Ochotorena was wounded during the last assault when another soldier near him stepped on an
anti-personnel mine causing it to explode. Due to the severity of his wound Ochotorena would be
in the hospital for the next four months.252 Company F was reduced to two officers and thirtyfour enlisted men. Company G had two officers and twenty-five enlisted men. Due to the
weakened state of the units, Companies E and F were temporarily combined with Company L to
form one company.253 In total, the 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment lost three
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officers and thirty-two enlisted men during the attack on San Pietro. Wounded in action were
seven officers and one-hundred and twenty-four enlisted men.254
It was not until after the battle that American commanders discovered the difficulty their
troops faced in attacking San Pietro. A battle report indicated that “in many instances the
Germans could call down their artillery and mortar fire directly on their own positions due to the
fact their emplacements were so well dug in and protected from heavy shelling.”255 During the
attack, the troops were not supplied with any type of climbing gear, even as something as simple
as ropes. This forced the troops “to stand upon one another‟s shoulders to scale the terraces”
while being fired upon by German mortars, artillery, and machine guns. Another obstacle faced
by the troops were the numerous landmines and booby traps the Germans had prepared for them
in the terraces.256
In the end, the only units that fared well were the 142nd Infantry Regiment and the Italian
forces fighting alongside them. Although the attack was said to have resulted in high casualties,
the two units managed to take their objective of Monte Lungo on December 16th.257
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American tanks that were supposed to help in the attack were quickly knocked out by German
artillery. As it turned out, the narrow roads they used gave them no room to maneuver and were
easy targets for the German gunners. The 143rd Infantry Regiment, which attacked from the north
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of San Pietro was also stopped by the well prepared German defenders. On December 17th,
patrols from the 36th Division finally entered San Pietro and discovered that the Germans had
already left.258
Among many of the wounded from Company E was Sgt. Ricardo Palacios, Jr. While
recovering in a hospital in Naples, Palacios was asked by a group of new troops if he had been at
the front lines. These troops seemed very eager to know in detail about what was going on and if
the fighting was hard. Palacios quickly became very annoyed from all of the questions he was
being asked. He thought to himself, “What does he expect me to tell him. Let them find out for
themselves.” Palacios and the other wounded knew that it would not help these soldiers to tell
them about the horrible fighting that was happening at the front. As soldiers, these men were
going to have to experience combat first hand one way or another.259
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Chapter 10
THE ROAD TO THE RAPIDO RIVER
With the fall of San Pietro, the 36th Division could now move on to their next objective
which was Monte Cassino. This region was of crucial importance to the Allies because past
Monte Cassino lay the Liri Valley which was a vital point where the Allies could make a quick
and decisive breakthrough into German lines. First, the valley had something the Allies
desperately needed, which was flat open ground well suited for tanks and other vehicles.
Secondly, from the Liri Valley, Rome was at the most one-hundred miles away, thus, giving the
Allies the “shortest route to Rome.”260
Allied commanders considered Monte Cassino the “strongest portion” of the Gustav Line
while the Germans considered it “the final line of defense south of Rome.”261 As it was, Monte
Cassino and its neighboring mountains offered excellent high ground for the Germans to view all
of the Allies‟ troop movements for miles on end. Furthermore, Monte Cassino had a naturally
defensive barrier flowing in front of it, the Rapido River.262 The Allies‟slow push northward
gave the German 15th Panzer Grenadier Division plenty of time to prepare an elaborate set of
defenses. For several weeks, the Germans were busy “blasting gun pits out of solid rock, clearing
both sides of the Rapido of trees and shrubbery to create fields, digging and camouflaging rifle
pits, erecting forts and pillboxes, preparing antitank ditches, sowing mines, putting up wire
entanglements.”263
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Adding to the German defenses of the Rapido River was a village called San‟t Angelo.
The village was at a perfect location because it was at the center of the Rapido River on a hill
that rose almost fifty feet in height. Besides giving the Germans the ability to observe most of the
river, the thick walls of the town were reinforced offering great protection to the infantry and
even artillery units. Similar to the German defenses at San Pietro, bunkers were reinforced so
well with concrete and steel that defenders could call artillery down on their own positions
without fear of being harmed. In addition, machine gun positions were protected by barbwire,
landmines and booby traps. Finally, “machine guns were sighted in such a fashion that they
possessed interlocking bands of fire.” 264
The Allies soon discovered that just getting to the river was an obstacle in itself. The daily
“heavy rains and melting snow from the mountains had turned the rivers into torrents.”265 This
caused rivers to overflow and flood much of the surrounding terrain. Allied vehicles attempting
to drive over the flooded countryside sank ten inches deep into the mud. When the 36th Division
reached their staging area of Monte Trochio, which faced the Rapido River Valley, it was
described as being almost a swamp given that it was “marshy and water filled.”266
The idea to make an attack across the Rapido River came on January 8, 1944 when Allied
commanders approved a plan to make an amphibious assault on Anzio. Far up the coast of Italy,
Anzio was about seventy-five miles away from any Allied forces which made the move very
perilous. A landing at Anzio could mean a faster way to capture Rome, but for this to work
264
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Allied troops needed to be within a reasonable distance in order to offer quick and decisive
support for the soldiers making the landings; otherwise, the amphibious force could be isolated
on the beaches and possibly wiped out before help got to them.267
General Mark W. Clark came up with the plan of having three separate attacks occur over
the span of several days. The French Expeditionary Corps would cross on the upper portion of
the Rapido River on January 12. The British X Corps would cross the Garigliano River at two
different points on January 17. Finally, the 36th Division, located in the center of the British and
French forces, would “deliver the knockout punch by crossing the Rapido River near
Sant‟Angelo and getting into the Liri Valley.”268 The hope was that the British and French forces
would take the high ground to offer better support for the 36th Division. Overall, Allied
commanders hoped for at least two possible outcomes that could arise from an assault over the
Rapido River. On the one hand, the Allied troops could establish a strong foothold at the
entrance of the Liri Valley forcing the Germans to divert troops away from the Anzio landings.
On the other hand, Allied commanders ultimately hoped for a complete breakthrough into the
Liri Valley that would allow for “a rapid link-up with the forces in the Anzio beachhead.”269
Although the plan would be an enormous success if the attack resulted in both outcomes, Allied
commanders knew that that was almost unlikely.
Originally, the 142nd and the 143rd Infantry Regiments were picked to make the crossing of
the Rapido River. The 142nd, however, was chosen to remain in reserve and replaced by the

267

Blumenson, 51.

268

Blumenson, 51,53, 54.

269

Blumenson, 51, 53.

78

141st. The 143rd would cross half a mile below the town while the 141st would cross the river
above Sant‟ Angelo. Before any attack could occur, the 36th Division needed time to gather its
strength. The division was weakened by both the high casualties sustained from the San Pietro
attack and illness caused from the horrendous winter conditions that continued into January.270
By January 13, the strength of Companies E, F, and G was brought back up with the help
of replacements. Company E had five officers and one-hundred and sixty enlisted men.
Company F had ten officers and one-hundred and seventy-eight enlisted men. Company G had
seven officers and one-hundred and forty-eight enlisted men.271 Tech Sgt. Raul Caracena
recalled that because of the high number of casualties suffered in the preceding campaigns,
“most of our outfit [Company E] were new men.”272 By this time most of the replacements
coming into the 36th Division were from other states besides Texas. The casualty report for
January would indicate that many of the replacements in the company were not of Mexican
ethnicity and not even from Texas.273 Some members of Company E would later reflect and
believed that this was because Mexican-American troops were outright refusing to join the
company because of its reputation of “spearheading every battle.”274 While this may not have
been the case, there was a very clear reason why the unit was no longer being kept MexicanAmerican. Vincent M. Lockhart, author of T-Patch to Victory, served with the 36th Division
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during the war, partly as the division historian, declared that it had to do with a decision made by
the War Department. During the war, the War Department decided “not to replace members of
the division with Texans because too many of the families were losing members. Some families
lost two and three brothers at the same time.”275 It is also reasonable that by this time in the war,
the military the U.S. Army was not going to spend precious time trying to keep Company E
entirely Mexican-American when other units and branches of the military were already
successfully integrated with soldiers, sailors, marines, and even airmen of Mexican ethnicity.
Therefore, with American casualties mounting in the Italian campaign it is possible that the only
thing that mattered to the Army and War Department was to get as many replacements as they
could for these units.
As planned, the French Expeditionary Force began their attack on January 12. Although
meeting with initial success, the lack of reinforcements hindered the French forces from making
a breakthrough into the Liri Valley and after four days of continuous combat the exhausted
French troops could push no further.276 Next, the British X Corps attacked across the Garigliano
River on January 17. Like the French attack, the British met the crossings with early success, but
were soon repelled by a formidable German counterattack. The British tried another attack on
January 19, but it too failed. Given the circumstances, British commanders stopped their forces
from making any additional attacks across the Garigliano River.277 Without doubt, any more
attempts to attack the Gustav Line directly should have been cancelled, but General Mark W.
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Clark was determined to make a breakthrough somewhere. The fact of the matter was that the
36th Division was going in with odds stacked exceedingly against them.
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Chapter 11
THE END OF COMPANY E
A few days before the 36th Division would make the crossings at the Rapdio River, patrols
were formed to cross the river and gather intelligence on the German defenses and, if possible, to
capture any enemy prisoners. The patrols consisted of troops from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of
the 141st Infantry Regiment. One of these patrols was comprised of 2nd Lt. Gabriel L. Navarrete
and about sixty-two others from Company E. Their mission was different in that they were “to
take and hold a point of high ground about 500 yards on the other side of the river.” As if that
was not difficult enough, they were to hold this high ground until January 20 when the rest of the
division would cross the Rapido River and help in the capture of San‟t Angelo. 278
The men soon discovered that just getting to the river was no simple task since all of the
patrols first had to make their way through elaborate minefields. As Navarrete prepared to take
his first step, a Staff Sergeant named Roque O. Segura stopped him insisting that he lead the
patrol through the minefield instead. Besides being a long time friend, Segura felt that Navarrete
was an intelligent officer and too valuable to the company to risk becoming an early casualty.
Segura told Navarrete that he would be badly needed once they got across the river.279 Navarrete
reluctantly agreed to allow Segura to lead the patrol through the minefield. As Segura reached a
safe point, the men followed and carefully traced each of his steps through the minefield. Once
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across, the patrol now had the second difficult task of getting across the river in one piece both
without alerting the Germans or tipping over in their rubber boats.280
The river‟s current was so strong that a rope needed to be tied on both sides so that the
troops could carefully guide themselves across the river; otherwise, there was a great risk that the
light rubber boats would easily tip over. Once at the river the men secured a rope on their side
while Segura swam across the Rapido River to tie the other end of the rope to the German side
and swim back. To anyone else, Segura‟s task would have looked outrageous, but he was
considered the best swimmer in the company and proved it on that night.281
Navarrete‟s patrol crossed the Rapido at 9:30 p.m. on January 17. Amazingly, the
Company E patrol seemed to be the only one that had successfully crossed the river up to that
point. A patrol from Company L had also crossed in another section of the Rapido, but one of
their two rubber boats collapsed sending the men into the icy cold water. This forced part of the
patrol to go back and retrieve another rubber boat. Another portion of Company L that attempted
to cross the river never got the opportunity. This group became bogged down in a minefield and
were discovered by the Germans who then fired artillery down on them.282
When the Company E patrol finally reached the German side of the river, it divided into
two groups. Navarrete directed Staff Sergeant Benito Dominguez to lead his squad of about
twelve men forward while the rest of the patrol waited near the river bank. Navarrate also told
Dominguez and his men to “make five or six gaps” in the barbed wire that lay ahead of them so
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as to allow the patrol to make their way through it. In addition, Dominguez‟s squad was also
meant to draw the enemy‟s fire so that Navarrete could tell exactly how many machine gun nests
the Germans had in that specific area.283
Over the next three hours, after advancing one-hundred and fifty yards into enemy lines,
the squad surprised and captured two German soldiers. The squad continued to advance to an
estimated eight hundred yards from the river when they were discovered by a German they
attempted to capture. The German fired at the squad wounding Dominguez and alerting the rest
of the Germans of their presence. Amid the firefight that erupted, “one of the prisoners attempted
to escape. Maintaining his presence of mind, Sergeant Dominguez returned the fire, killing his
assailant and the escaping prisoner.”284 As the squad came under fire, the rest of the patrol
moved forward to assist in their withdrawal. Sergeant Manuel Rivera was a weapons platoon
leader and organized his section of men armed with Browning light machine guns to help give
covering fire and successfully managed to silence four German machine guns.285 Navarrete was
attempting to outflank the machine gun nests when he realized that they were about to be
encircled by a sizeable German force. To make sure they were not cut off from escaping,
Navarrete and Dominguez led their men back near the banks of the river.286
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The firefight lasted for almost twenty minutes. Although holding their ground, the
Germans began shelling the area with mortars and artillery wounding many men in the patrol.
One mortar landed close enough to wound both Navarrete and Rivera. The mortar attack had also
destroyed four of the six rubber boats the patrol had used to cross the river. With the situation
only getting worse, Dominguez, Rivera, and Navarrete began helping the severely wounded onto
the two undamaged rubber boats remaining in order to cross back onto their side of the river. As
the last of the wounded were placed in the boats, Rivera told Navarrete to join the other wounded
men in one of the boats since his wound prevented him from swimming across the river. Rivera,
who was only lightly wounded, planned to swim across the river along with others from the
patrol that were still capable. After getting back to their lines. Rivera went to his company
commander Captain John L. Chapin to tell him “that the patrol had failed.” Subsequently, Rivera
was sent to a hospital to get medical treatment. Little did he realize that this would be the last
time he would see many of his friends since his wounds prevented him from participating in the
actual Rapido River crossing.287 Navarrete later stated “it was a miracle to have been able to get
out of their trap and make it back to our side.”288
The total number of casualties in the sixty-two man patrol was fourteen enlisted men
wounded, two enlisted men missing in action and one officer wounded.289 Both Dominguez and

287

Leigh E. Smith, Jr. “El Paso‟s Company E Survivors Remember Rapido River Assaults.” Borderlands 13(Spring
1995:7), EPCC Libraries, http://dnn.epcc.edu/nwlibrary/borderlands /13_el_paso_company_e.
htm (accessed 2/2/09); 36th Division Silver Star Awards, October 1943-May 1944, Lorenzo de Zavala State Library
and Archives Commission, Austin, microfilm, roll 2078.
288

Morin, 69.

289 nd

2 Battalion Journal, 141st Infantry Regiment, January 18, 1944, Lorenzo de Zavala State Library and Archives
Commission, Austin, microfilm, 97, roll 3028.

85

Rivera would receive the Silver Star for gallantry in action.290 While waiting to be taken to a
hospital for his wounds, Navarrete was asked by a major if he thought a battalion could cross the
Rapido River successfully. Navarrete replied that not even a regiment much less a battalion
could make a successful crossing. Navarrete further explained that from what he saw “the
Germans had concentrated their defense at that point, [and] that it was like bumping against a
brick wall.”291 The major completely disregarded his story and told Navarrete that “you are
talking like that because you are delirious because of the wound.”292 Navarrete vented that,
unlike some new recruit that had never seen combat, he had been wounded before and had led
over thirty patrols up to that point; therefore, he was an experienced soldier and was not over
exaggerating about the consolidated German defenses that he and the other members of the
patrol saw firsthand. Navarrete, cold, wounded, and growing frustrated continued arguing with
the major trying to convince him that the attack should be stopped. This only annoyed the major
who threatened to court-martial Navarrete if he persisted. Navarrete recalled that the major told
him, “you are suffering from bad wounds and will be excused if you go back to the station
hospital and forget about this.”293
Navarrete felt there was nothing more he could do to prevent his men and the rest of the
36th Division from being sent to face a strong and well dug in German force. However, right
before Navarrete departed the major‟s tent, he gave him a stern warning saying “remember this,
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Major, if plans are not changed and you sacrifice my E Company, you are going to answer to me
personally; I will be looking for you and I will be armed.”294 Afterwards, Navarrete reluctantly
left to a medical station where he could only hope and pray that his comrades would be safe.
Tech Sgt. Antonio D. Saucedo detailed that before the attack a member of Navarrete‟s
patrol told him that the German defenses were “too strong and that an attack probably would
fail.” It seemed that some of the officers did not believe what the patrol saw and even accused
one member of being “shell-shocked.”295 Sgt. Ricardo Palacios, Jr. also indicated that the night
before the attack a meeting was held among the sergeants and officers to discuss details about the
upcoming assault. Palacios recalled that meeting saying “you could tell everyone was pretty
uptight after the reconnaissance had failed.”296 By this time, news had spread around the camp
concerning the aftermath of the patrols and Navarrete would later discover that he was not the
only one trying to stop the attack from proceeding. The majority of the company commanders
who knew Navarrete acknowledged him as a skilled and competent officer; thus, he was not the
type to lie about what he reported on the German defenses. Many of these company commanders
tried to prevent the crossing by reasoning with the battalion commander that the attack was a
suicide mission. The battalion commanders‟ response was that he was just following the orders
given to him by the regimental commander. When the regimental commander was confronted, he
responded with the same justification that was given by the battalion commander, that these were
orders given to him from a higher rank. In the end, the company commanders realized that the
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situation was out of their hands and that there was nothing they could do. Plans for the 36th
Division to attack were still going ahead as scheduled for January 20. 297
The report from Navarrete‟s patrol revealed that the width of the river was estimated at
somewhere between thirty and fifty feet and that the depth of the river was over six feet with a
current of twenty miles per hour. No one but an accomplished swimmer would be able to make it
across safely without drowning. Lastly, the report specified that the banks of the river were a
steep six feet on each side.298 Once across the river, each soldier would be responsible for
digging a “fighting hole” before the onset of daylight. All of the troops making the assault were
given extra ammunition and four grenades for the attack. The 2nd Battalion of the 19th Engineer
Regiment were attached to the 36th Division and assigned to help in the assault. The idea was
that the troops attacking on January 20 would cross in assault boats; meanwhile engineers would
build support bridges to get supplies and more troops on the other side in the following days of
the attack.299
The 1st Battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment was the first to begin crossing the Rapido
River at 8:30 p.m. on January 20. As daylight came, the men of the 1st Battalion quickly realized
the vulnerability of their positions when the Germans unleashed a barrage of artillery, mortars,
rockets, machine gun and rifle fire. One soldier of the 1st Battalion indicated that “if anyone
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stuck their head up or revealed themselves they immediately drew fire.”300 All they could do was
hold on until they were reinforced.
At around 9:40 p.m. of January 21, Captain Chapin led Company E across the river while
under intense enemy fire from artillery, mortars, and machine guns.301 The enemy fire was very
intense but also seemed to be coming from several directions. It was only inevitable that men
were going to get wounded or killed during the crossing. Company E Tech Sergeant Antonio D.
Saucedo did not even manage to cross the river because a piece of an exploding artillery shell
wounded him in the leg. Saucedo said that considering the severity of the enemy fire he thought
of “himself lucky to have come within 50 yards of the river. Many didn‟t.”302 The task of
crossing during this time was even more difficult weapons platoon in Company E because of the
heavy weight of their equipment and the ammunition needed to fire the weapons.303
The company managed to get five-hundred yards from the river when they were stopped
by large entanglements of barbed wire. Considering what had happened to Navarrete‟s patrol a
few nights earlier, the troops knew that it was vital for them to get through the barb wire as fast
as possible. During this time, Sgt. Roque O. Segura, Pfc. Rudolph M. Treviño, and Pfc. Julio De
Hoyas were sent by Chapin to go and “destroy the enemy machine gun nest” that was firing at
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them.304 Using the cover of darkness, the three men closed in on the machine gun crew without
being seen and killed them with the use of grenades. Afterward, Segura, Treviño, and De Hoyas
were making their way back to their lines when they were suddenly fired upon. Both Segura and
De Hoyas were hit, but it appeared to Treviño that De Hoyas had a more severe wound since he
was on the ground bleeding from his head and neck. Treviño said, “I rushed to him and could see
where the rifle shot glazed the back of his neck and went up and made a hole in the top of his
helmet.”305 Since Segura was still on his feet, Treviño believed he had only been lightly
wounded.
Unfortunately, during the heat of battle and while attending to De Hoyas, Treviño lost
sight of Segura and was unsure what had happened to him. Originally believing that Segura was
possibly captured, Treviño did not realize that his friend had died. When Treviño and De Hoyas
finally rejoined their unit, they discovered that the company was still bogged down trying to
make their way through the barbed wire. As bad as things were, the situation was about to get
much worse. As daylight approached on the morning of January 22, the American troops no
longer had the cover of darkness on their side and the Germans would be able to get a better
view of the battlefield. Trevino remembered that Chapin ordered the men to dig foxholes and
soon after the young captain‟s voice fell silent.306 The man that had done so much for Company
E whenever they faced obstacles, such as discrimination, was killed by German machine gun
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fire. Staff Sergeant Robert Moncada would later state, “we lost the best commander that a
company ever had.”307
At 11:10 a.m., regimental headquarters of the 141st sent out orders that all troops on the
German side of the river were to dig in and hold their ground. 2nd Lt. Richard M. Manton who
was leading Company E‟s weapons platoon remembered getting on a radio and asking for
permission to retreat soon after crossing the river, but was denied. The enemy fire was so great
that it barely gave Manton‟s men the chance to operate their weapons. After Manton‟s platoon
ran out of ammunition for their weapons, he again tried getting permission to retreat. There is no
doubt that Manton must have been in disbelief when he was denied for a second time and told to
hold his ground. Manton‟s men were now pinned down and defenseless against the German
onslaught.308 Around the same time the 143rd Infantry Regiment was withdrawn from the attack
it was conducting farther down the Rapido River. This only allowed the Germans to put the full
weight of their forces on the attacking units of the 141st Infantry Regiment. By 4:45 p.m. the
Germans launched a fierce counterattack so great it caused the 36th Division to falsely believe
that enemy troops had landed on their side of the river.309 The result of the German
counterattack was that “all bridges and boats were destroyed, the men could neither escape nor
be reinforced, and communications irretrievably broke down.”310 In the end, 36th Division

307

El Paso Times, July 4, 1944, 2.

308

2nd Battalion Journal, 141st Infantry Regiment. January 22, 1944, Lorenzo de Zavala State Library and Archives
Commission, Austin, microfilm, 157, 158, roll 3028; Smith, 55.
309 nd

2 Battalion Journal, 141st Infantry Regiment. January 22, 1944, Lorenzo de Zavala State Library and Archives
Commission, Austin, microfilm, 157, 158, roll 3028; Parker, 114.
310

Parker, 114.

91

commanders realized their men were sent into a death trap and could only listen helplessly to the
battle taking place on the other side of the river.
During this counterattack, Treviño indicated that a lieutenant recently added to the
company ordered the men to cease fire. The lieutenant even went so far as removing “his white
long johns, then wrapped the sleeves around his carbine rifle and waved it in the air as he
shouted his orders to cease fire.”311 Treviño and Tech Sergeant Eduardo Romo said that some of
the men were angered with that order and wanted to continue fighting. Yet, perhaps it was a
good thing that they did not for as quickly as the men put down their weapons German soldiers
were already upon them; furthermore, most of the men had run out of ammunition. One German
soldier forced Treviño out of his foxhole by holding a bayonet to his throat and yelling “zip-zip.”
Although this caused some momentary confusion for Treviño, he quickly realized that the
German meant he would shoot him if he did not get out of his foxhole.312 At 7:00 p.m.
regimental headquarters of the 141st received a message that the German counterattack had
“practically wiped out” their battalions and those that remained that were not killed or captured
had crossed back to the American side of the river.313
While many men in the assaulting units became prisoners, a few managed to evade
capture. Two of these men were Company E Sergeants Santiago Jaramillo and Alex Carrillo who
stated that “We would rather die than be captured by the Germans.”314 Jaramillo stated that the
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fighting was fierce and that the company was trying to hold on as long as it could, but as the
fighting neared its end, he could hear German troops yelling “Give up, give up!” Jaramillo was
in his foxhole when he saw several Germans taking what was left of Company E prisoner. Just as
he was about to be taken prisoner himself, the German soldier guarding Jaramillo was hit in the
shoulder by a bullet causing him to drop his sub-machine gun. Although Jaramillo did not know
where the shot had come from he realized that this was the only chance he would have of
escaping. Both men quickly dove for the weapon, but luckily, Jaramillo reached it first and
managed to kill the German soldier.315
Although initially fearing that the “firing might bring other Germans over,” none ever
came. More than likely, hearing the sound of one of their own weapons caused them to believe
that a fellow German soldier was firing his weapon. Moreover, a thick fog prevented them from
seeing what had actually occurred. Although the fog had caused many problems for the 36th
Division trying to cross the Rapido River, in the end, Jaramillo stated “that fog saved a lot of our
necks.” Jaramillo managed to link up with fellow Company E members Alex Carrillo and Morris
Crain.316
The three men hid in a crater made from an artillery shell that, for some reason, was
never searched by the Germans. When night fall came, the three men tried on two separate
occasions to cross the river but were stopped by German “small arms fire.” It was not until later
that morning that they made a third attempt to cross the river. The men knew that it was only a
matter of time before the Germans would capture or kill them; therefore, this third attempt to
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cross the river would have to be their last. The men removed any and all equipment that could
slow them down in the river which included their winter clothing and even their boots. Jaramillo
stated “we waded as far as we could and then swam as fast as we could when the German bullets
began splashing around. When we got to the other side, we kept running until we were behind
safe cover.”317 According to Jaramillo‟s family, he learned to swim in the Franklin Canal in his
hometown of El Paso, Texas. Swimming was the one thing Jaramillo loved to do so much that he
occasionally skipped school to go swim. No doubt his love of swimming as a youth saved his life
and gave him the ability to swim across a river where so many others had perished.318 Jaramillo
and the others deemed themselves very fortunate to have survived the crossing considering the
number of others that were killed in the process. The men then ran two and a half miles back to
their lines barefoot, soaked, and freezing. Upon reaching their lines medics quickly “worked on
their half frozen feet to restore circulation.”319
While at the hospital, Navarrete began noticing the huge number of wounded pouring in.
All of them had the 36th Division‟s T-Patch insignia on their arms. Navarrete desperately tried to
find any soldier that could tell him something about what happened to his men. He finally found
a member of Company E that told Navarrete that Cpt. John L. Chapin and Sgt. Roque O. Segura
had been killed. Filled with rage and bent on vengeance, Navarrete said this was “the time when
I just couldn‟t take it anymore.”320 Navarrete left the hospital and stole a jeep to get to the
battalion headquarters to look for the major he had warned earlier. Admitting that he no longer
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cared about the consequences for his actions, Navarrete stated “the thing I wanted was to
challenge him to a duel. Right then and there. Either him or me and that‟s it.”321
As he made his way to battalion headquarters he was stopped by a colonel. It appeared that
by this time word had spread about Navarrete‟s intentions and the general of the 36th Division,
Walton Walker, sent out a message to his officers to find and stop Navaerrete before it was too
late. After arriving at his headquarters, Walker and Navarrete had a long discussion in which he
“told Navarrete he could understand how he felt, but he could not condone a junior officer
challenging a superior officer. Navarrete was also told that the major had been transferred out of
the division. Navarrete obeyed the general‟s order and was promoted to captain and put in
command of E Company.”322 Although Navarrete was later recommended for the Congressional
Medal of Honor, it was canceled due the incident that occurred with the major.323
Overall, approximately 770 men of the 36th Division were captured and an estimated 1,330
were either dead or wounded. Navarrete would later mention that “the Germans could have
driven right through our lines, all the way to Naples, if they had known how few of us were
left.”324 When the company held a roll call on January 23, only twenty-seven enlisted men were
present. All of the officers were either dead, wounded, or captured.325 While the 36th Division
would regroup and fight on until the end of the war in 1945, the same could not be said of
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Company E. After the battle Companies E and G were temporarily combined to form one single
company due to their depleted state. For the month of February the two companies were mainly
held in reserve and given small tasks to perform. This included establishing defensive positions
and running patrols between other units of the division. Between February 20 and 26, Company
E and other units of the 36th Division were finally given replacements.326 Historian Lee Carraway
Smith stated that the battle of the Rapido River brought “the end of E Company‟s distinction of
being the Hispanic company. With almost every man in the company either killed, wounded, or
captured, the company had been deprived of its ethnic distinction as well as its well-established
reputation as a company of fierce and determined fighters.”327
Navarrete stated in a 1946 interview that the areas of the Rapido River used by the 36th
Division to cross were also chosen by the Germans “as the logical place for an attempt to cross
and had zeroed their sights in advance. Our side used smoke screens in the crossing but the
Germans didn‟t have to see to be able to mow men down. ”328 Tech Sgt. Antonio D. Saucedo
would later state that although the soft muddy ground hindered the troops, it “probably saved
many lives. If the ground had been hard the heavy artillery would have caused more casualties.”
The mud caused the German artillery shells to sink further into the ground before detonating and
absorbing much of the explosion.329
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The consequences of the attack were staggering; what was worse was that considering the
great loss of life nothing was accomplished. Ultimately, with no possibility of a link-up, Allied
soldiers landing at Anzio would face a hard fought battle to hold the beachhead from
overwhelming German forces. It was reported that because the attack was considered such a
great failure and embarrassment that high ranking officials in the U.S. Army tried to make sure
that the truth about the battle was never revealed. Historian Raul Morin affirmed that “no names
or identification of the units who participated are mentioned in combat history publications of the
5th Army. There are no specific mentioning‟s of any one company in the 36th Division‟s 5 Years5 Countries-5 Campaigns, which has the historical accounts of the 141st Regiment in Italy during
W.W. II.”330
On January 25, American and German forces agreed to a truce so that the bodies of the
dead could be collected. Sergeant Jesus M. Lucio and others from Company E discovered the
body of Captain John L. Chapin. Lucio stated “we found Captain Chapin in his foxhole with his
phone in one hand and his carbine in the other.”331 Both Chapin and Staff Sergeant Roque O.
Segura were awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in action. At a special ceremony held in Ft.
Bliss, Texas, Segura‟s mother, Mrs. G. B. Segura, was given the award meant for her son by post
commander Colonel John K. Brown.332
Navarrete remained as Captain of Company E only for a few months. Around June 1944
Navarrete was relieved of his command and sent back to the U.S. where he was given a two
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week furlough to visit his family in El Paso. Navarrete was then re-assigned as a training
instructor at a military post in California training new recruits for combat overseas. He would
return to El Paso in August 1945 after the war ended.333 After being wounded at the Rapido
River, Tech Sgt. Antonio D. Saucedo spent nineteen days in the hospital before rejoining
Company E. In July 1944, Saucedo was sent back to the U.S. after spending a total of eighteen
months overseas. That same month five other members of the company were also sent back to
the U.S. Private First Class Celestino Solis; Sergeants Joe Briones and Rodolfo Acosta; and Staff
Sergeants Carlos C. Campos and Robert P. Moncada were given time off and apparently reassigned to other duties in the U.S.334 By late 1944 Staff Sergeant Enrique Ochotorena was also
sent back to the U.S.335
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Chapter 12
LIFE AS A PRISONER OF WAR
Under normal circumstances, January 21 should have been a day of celebration for Sgt.
Ricardo Palacios, Jr., since it was his twenty-second birthday. Instead, he would always
remember that this was the day when he crossed the Rapido River and saw many of his fellow
troops either killed or wounded. Palacios indicated that of the fifty men he had led across the
river, only two were left at the time of his capture.336 The official casualty list showed that
Company E had eighty-two enlisted men and three officers registered as missing in action,
presumably captured.337 Among those taken prisoner at the Rapido River were 2nd Lt. Richard
M. Manton, Tech Sgt. Raul Caracena, Tech Sgt. Eduardo Romo, Pfc. Juan Saucedo, and Sgt.
Palacios. 338 Caracena was in his foxhole when an artillery shell exploded near him and knocked
him unconscious. The power of the blast had managed to lob a large amount of soil on top of
Caracena burying him alive. Luckily, he was saved by his comrades but, awoke to discover that
he was a prisoner of war.339 From Italy, the prisoners traveled by foot and by train to prisoner of
war camps in Germany. Palacios remembered what happened to him before his first interrogation
by the Germans. Recognizing that Palacios was of some Hispanic ethnicity, German troops
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asked him if he understood English. If not, they were willing to get an interrogator that was
fluent in Spanish. Palacios informed his captors that he could speak English and Spanish.340
One of the most terrifying moments for Palacios came when he was taken to see a German
officer. Palacios remembered that the officer seemed aggravated and stated “he looked at me
with red eyes as if he was gonna get a gun and shoot me.”341 The officer began yelling at
Palacios “Americana hund!,” but Palacios had no idea what the officer was saying. Afterward, he
was taken and made to stand with two other American prisoners. Only a few feet in front of them
were two German soldiers and their sergeant setting up a machine gun. More American prisoners
were then brought out as if to be witnesses to what was about to take place. Palacios and the
others realized they were about to be executed and then they heard the order for the Germans to
fire the machinegun. Much to their surprise and delight, the whole event was nothing more than a
joke. The Germans had fired the machine gun over the heads of Palacios and the other two
American prisoners. However, when the firing began the soldier standing next to Palacios fell to
the ground. When Palacios checked on the man on him and saw no wounds, he realized the man
had fainted from the sheer fright of the incident.342
Palacios and many of the others never remained at one specific camp for long and recalled
being at a total of five P.O.W. camps. More often than not, the prisoners were forced to travel on
foot, knee deep in snow, without being given food or water while German troops would ride on
horseback. Palacios stated that if a prisoner wanted water they would get a little bit of snow and
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place it in their mouth. As tired as the men would get in these long marches they kept each other
moving because German guards threatened to shoot any prisoner that refused to move.343 During
one of their winter travels to another camp, Palacios almost lost one of his good friends Raul
Caracena. Having had no food or water, Caracena was on the verge of collapsing from
exhaustion and told Palacios, “I‟m gonna stay here. I don‟t care if they shoot me.” Palacios
having already lost enough of his friends did not want to lose anymore. He picked up Caracena
and helped carry him to the next camp.344
At the camps, Palacios indicated that officers and non-commissioned officers such as
sergeants, like himself, were held with high respect among the German guards and were never
used for hard labor. They were kept at the prison camps while prisoners at the rank of privates
were used as a labor force on farms. Privates used this to their advantage by sneaking in food
such as chicken eggs and vegetables that they had stolen while working on German farms.
Considering that the prisoners were only fed once a day, officers and non-commissioned were
clearly at a disadvantage. To feed the prisoners the German guards used horse drawn wagons to
take large barrels filled with cooked vegetables to the camp. Prisoners would form a line and
were given one cup sized portion with one slice of bread.345
The prisoners were also used to clear debris and rubble left over from the aftermath of
Allied bombing raids over German cities. Palacios indicated that he along with other prisoners at
the camp could hear the rumble of the bombs hitting nearby cities. Sometimes the prisoners
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would see the Allied bomber formations which, at first, worried them because they felt that they
would be mistaken for a German military camp and accidently bombed. Among the prisoners
were members of the U.S. Army Air Corps who calmed their nerves by letting them know that
the pilots knew what targets to hit and which ones to bypass.346
In at least one of the camps where Palacios was held prisoner, he remembered there were
an estimated two-hundred other American prisoners. Their sleeping quarters consisted of several
bunk beds stacked in threes. The prisoners only received one blanket and no pillows. Every
morning the German guards held a roll call to make sure none of the prisoners had escaped. On
one morning Palacios did not make the roll call because he had contracted pneumonia. One of
the prisoners that spoke German informed the German guards that Palacios was ill and could not
move. 347
A German guard with his dog then entered the barracks, but not before setting his dog
loose. Palacios was thankful he was sleeping on the very top bunk because the dog could not
reach him. When the guard realized that Palacios was, in fact, ill he left with his dog only to
come back later to escort Palacios to another barrack. Palacios soon realized that it was a medical
barrack and he was there to be treated. Later that same day a German guard escorted a captive
from the Russian prisoner camp that was adjacent to the American camp. As it turned out, the
Russian prisoner was a doctor who treated Palacios some sort of medication. Palacios was unsure
what exactly the pills were but it helped him recover. Besides medication, a German guard
would come by everyday to bring Palacios his daily ration of food. After spending a week
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recovering at the medical barracks, Palacios was finally taken back to join his comrades who
were very glad to see that he was still alive and well.348
Although the American, Russian, and Polish prisoners were in the same camp, they were
separated according to nationality. The abuse taken by the Russian prisoners from the German
guards could be easily seen by the Americans. When asked to compare the treatment of
American prisoners to Russian and Polish prisoners, his response was “you can‟t compare. I saw
some of those Russians being treated pretty bad.”349 One event that Palacios vividly
remembered was during the winter when Russian prisoners were brought out and forced to crawl
in deep snow while German guards would walk by and strike them.350
As the war was drawing to a close, so was the time that these men would spend as
prisoners. On the morning of April 22, 1945, a Russian reconnaissance unit was seen near the
camp. By this time, however, Palacios indicated that the German guards knew that Russian
forces were closing in and had decided to abandon camp. This allowed Palacios and four others
to ransack the office building where information was kept on the prisoners. The men managed to
retrieve their records and that of the comrades. Only a few days after the Russian reconnaissance
unit was seen the Russian army liberated the camp. The men were ecstatic believing that their
freedom was now guaranteed. However, the situation quickly turned into one of fear when the
American prisoners attempted to leave and were abruptly forced at gun point by Russian troops
to go back into the camp. Palacios and possibly some of the other American prisoners believed
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they were going to be sent to Russia to be used as slave labor. It was then that Palacios, Eduardo
Romo, and Juan Padilla decided they would rather escape than risk becoming slaves to the
Russians. However, Palacios stated that when he told the other members of Company E that he
was planning on escaping, “they didn‟t like the idea because they were afraid I was gonna get
killed.”351
Eduardo Romo was the only other member of Company E that decided to escape with
Palacios. Juan Padilla, on the other hand, was part of another U.S. Army division and had been
captured during the Allied landings at Anzio.352 After several days of planning Romo, Palacios,
and Padilla decided they would escape on May 6. Their plan did not involve any elaborate
strategies, but just a straightforward act of communication. The three men walked up to a
Russian guard and made an effort to convince him that they were Americans and that they
wanted to leave. While the guard could not speak English he apparently understood what they
were trying to tell him and merely motioned in a way to let them know that he was going to let
them leave without reporting it. The three men quickly jumped the barbed wire fence onto the
other side; unfortunately, another Russian guard saw what was occurring and began firing at
them. Palacios later said that it was a “good thing” they chose to escape at dusk because it
allowed for better cover to escape.353
After walking for about three days trying to get to American line, Palacios, Romo, and
Padilla ran into a convoy of American trucks. A soldier in the convoy asked them if they were
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Americans, to which they happily replied that they were indeed. The soldier asked them what
they were doing and they began telling him of their ordeal. The soldier informed the three that
the trucks were meant to go and pick up American prisoners that the Russians had liberated from
German prisoner of war camps.354 It was not until later that the three men found out that the
reason the Russians desired to keep them in the camp was so that they could be returned back to
their respective nations later.355
Palacios and the others were taken back to American lines and as they got off the trucks
saw a large number of Germans surrendering. As they passed by a pile of German weapons
standing almost five feet high, an American soldier turned to them and told them to get whatever
guns they wanted. Considering they had not eaten since their escape, Palacios replied to the
soldier that he wanted food instead. The men were given a shower and new clothing which was
followed by a health inspection. Palacios acknowledged that he originally weighed one-hundred
and forty pounds before being captured but after spending fifteen months as a prisoner of war
was down to ninety-eight pounds. Before long, Palacios was given twelve days of leave in
London, England and was then sent back to the U.S. where he was given his discharge on
September 17, 1945. 356
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Chapter 13
AFTER THE WAR
As the war ended, millions of American men were now being sent back to the U.S. to
return to their civilian lives. While the adjustment would take time these men were happy just to
be back home. The horrors seen by the men of Company E and the 36th Division during the battle
of the Rapido River were memories that would never leave them. As Ricardo Palacios Jr.
recalled during an interview, “That‟s something unforgettable. Sometimes you have those
nightmares and you feel like somebody‟s gonna kill you or you‟re killing somebody. It‟s awful.
It never goes away.” To this day, Palacios considers himself very lucky to have survived the war.
One of the things he believes contributed to his survival were the prayers his mother read and
taught him. He still reads these prayers that he learned from his mother.357
For many of these veterans the anger still remained for the man they held responsible for
sending them to cross the Rapido River, specifically General Mark Clark who commanded the
5th Army in Italy. When the 36th Division held its first annual reunion in Brownwood, Texas in
January 1946, the veterans of the Rapido crossing demanded that a Congressional investigation
take place.358 The other issue that had angered these veterans so much was when President
Harry Truman wanted to promote Clark to the rank of five-star general. Many of these veterans
felt that Clark did not deserve the promotion since his incompetence led to the great loss of life
and devastation of the 36th Division. By this time Clark was commanding an occupying force in
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Austria and seemed unbothered by what the 36th Division Association wanted to do. 359
Eventually, the investigation was to be held by the War Department and not Congress
since it was understood that a military court would have a better understanding of military
operations that would a civilian court. The veterans even had the backing of a Corpus Christi
Representative John E. Lyle. It appeared that Lyle besides being a native Texas had also served
in the war and thus connected with these men of the 36th Division.360 It was at this time that the
truth behind what happened at the battle began to surface. Navarrete was asked by 36th Division
veterans to appear at the hearing that was taking place at the Pentagon. Navarrete revealed that
he had been given strict orders to keep secret what had transpired at the Rapido River.
Unfortunately for the veterans, the War Department defended Clark‟s action stating that the
“Rapido crossing was necessary to the success of the Anzio landing in Italy.”361 Not only was
Clark still given his promotion to the rank of major general, but also given the Navy‟s
Distinguished Service Medal for “exceptionally meritorious services” during the Italian
campaign. Still, to many of the veterans the fact that the truth of the battle was brought to light
held some sense of consolation.362
The results of the investigation probably did not come as a complete surprise to the
veterans considering that from the beginning of the investigation it seemed that many in the
government and military did not want the investigation to occur. The Chairman of the House
Military Affairs Committee was quoted as saying to the press that even General Dwight D.
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Eisenhower and other high ranking officers in the U.S. Army were against the investigation.
Overall, it appeared that if this investigation did place Clark responsible for the disaster then it
would automatically result in an endless list to investigate other blunders that occurred in the
war.363
Later in 1946, a Veterans of Foreign Wars Post was created in El Paso. The post was
named after two El Pasoans that were killed in action in the European campaign. The first was
Felix McDonald who had served in World War I and decided to serve again despite having a
waiver that prevented him from being drafted. McDonald lost his life during the invasion of
Normandy. The second name on the post was that of Roque O. Segura who was killed during the
Rapido River battle. Gabriel L. Navarrete would serve as the first official commander of the
Segura-McDonald VFW Post.364
In September 3, 1948, a monument was dedicated to those soldiers killed during World
War II who were from Bowie High School. During the war, a large number of students left
Bowie to help in the war effort. Specifically in 1943, the school‟s enrollment had dropped from
1,400 students to 760. Much of the male students left school to join the military while the female
student body also left to find work. The monument had the names of forty young men that were
killed in the war. One of these names was Company E member Roque O. Segura. Among the
five-hundred people in attendance were the former members of Company E, some of whom
“comprised the color guard.”365
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Most of these men would go on to live quiet lives trying to forget the horrors they saw in
combat. Gabriel L. Navarrete was one whose good deeds would keep him in the public eye for
years to come after the war. In August 1953, Navarrete was named the new El Paso County
Veterans Service Officer where he managed to countless veterans and their families that were in
dire conditions because the Veterans Administration had rejected their benefits cases. Navarrete
would carefully and thoroughly examine these and eventually re-send them to the Veterans
Administration. The cases that were handled by Navarrete were rarely ever rejected twice.
Because of this reputation many veterans and their dependents referred to Navarrete as a “special
guardian angel.” Being a veteran himself, Navarrete declared “I feel that the man who has placed
his life on the line for his belief in his country deserves every benefit appropriated to him.” In
1961 alone he helped veterans and their dependents living in El Paso county receive benefits that
totaled to $1,371,222, which was a new county record. By 1968, the amount of money going to
veterans and/or their dependents had risen to $4,500,000. This was said to have helped the El
Paso economy since it “reduced the number of those on welfare,” especially widows and their
families.366
In October 1982, a California based film crew arrived in El Paso to interview a handful of
the members of Company E. The film crew worked for Mestizo Production Associates and coproducer Alfredo Lugo declared that “Mestizo was formed solely for doing more programs on
Hispanics and try to erase the negative images of them on television.” Lugo had heard a few
stories about Gabriel L. Navarrete, but could find nothing about him or the Company E when
tried researching them in several history books. After contacting Navarrete, Lugo and director
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Harry Ratner decided to come to El Paso and film a documentary about the group as a way to
give them recognition. The documentary was backed by the League of United Latin American
Citizens and was funded using a $6,000 grant given to them by the Budweiser Corporation.367
In 1998, a new high school was being built near Ft. Bliss and the board of trustees from the
El Paso Independent School District decided that the school should be named after someone in
El Paso. The trustees also decided that this person had to have served in the military and “who
had done something special.” With the help of the President of the 36th Division Association,
Ray Wells, Dan Wever, who was on the board of trustees and school naming committee, began
his search for a possible nominee. Wever began tracking down members of Company E to ask
their opinion on who the school should be named after with the only rule being that it had to be
after someone that was already dead. All the men from Company that Wever interviewed had the
same response, Captain John L. Chapin.368 It is possible that some citizens of El Paso were
confused as to why Chapin was chosen and not Gabriel L. Navarrete. The fact was that many did
not understand the relationship and history the men of Company E had with Chapin.
In 2008, a memorial was built in El Paso, Texas dedicated to the men of Company E. The
memorial was an eight foot tall and fourteen foot wide bronze relief that had two illustrations.
On one side the men of Company E were depicted trying to cross the Rapido River while under
fire. The other side showed a list of names of all of the members of the company that were from
El Paso. The site chosen for the memorial was in South El Paso at the Chalio Acosta Recreation
Center. Many considered this the perfect place for the memorial since most of the El Paso
367
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members came from this part of the city. Before the memorial was built the only thing that stood
near the recreation center was a small sign dedicating the park to Company E.369 The only
unfortunate thing was that by this time most of the members of the company that had survived
the war had now passed away and were unable to see the monument dedicated to them.
Nonetheless, the memorial was a tribute that had been a long time coming and bestowed an
honor to these men that they rightfully deserved.
In 2009, rumors began that land was being set aside in Northeast El Paso in order to make
room for the construction of a new school. The same group of individuals that had advocated for
the memorial to be built believed this was their chance to have a school named after Gabriel L.
Navarrete. It is unknown if their efforts will be successful, but one can only wait and see what
the future holds.370
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Chapter 14
CONCLUSION
The Texas National Guard started Company E in 1923 with the intentions to Americanize
the Mexican population of El Paso; however, by the time Second World War began much had
changed within the Mexican populations of the U.S. They no longer saw themselves as
Mexicans, but as Mexican-Americans and their participation in the war only helped to solidify
this attitude. As a World War II veteran, Morin declared, “Most of us were more than glad to be
given the opportunity to serve in the war. We knew there was something great about this country
that was worth fighting for.”371 In effect, one can argue that Morin‟s statement was a sentiment
that was felt among the many minorities that contributed to the war and not just MexicanAmericans. Many scholars argue that it is because of this sentiment that the end of the war is
considered the initial starting point of the Civil Rights Movement. Fighting in the defense of the
U.S. gave many minority groups, including Mexican-Americans, the feeling that they were now
officially equals in American society. As American veterans, they were no longer going to accept
discrimination as they once did. One of the first of these movements was the American G.I.
Forum. Started in 1948 by Hector P. Garza and Mexican-American veterans, the organization
was formed to challenge the Veterans Administration which had denied numerous MexicanAmericans their military benefits.372
The end of World War II also brought changes to the units of the El Paso National Guard.
In order to make room for the anti-aircraft units of the National Guard, Company E and
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Company H were transferred to other parts of Texas in1946. Company E was assigned to be the
new National Guard unit of Corpus Christi.373 After the war, no other attempts were ever made
by the Texas National Guard to create a unit similar to Company E. It seemed that there was no
longer a need to do so since so many Mexican-Americans had served honorably in integrated
units in all branches of the military. Thus, Company E will always be known in history as the
first and only distinctly Mexican-American unit to have served in the U.S. Army and military in
general.
The exceptionality of Company E could only be matched by the uniqueness of the city that
was chosen for their formation. El Paso‟s peaceful coexistence with its large Mexican and
Mexican-American population proved it to be the ideal location for the Texas National Guard‟s
experiment. No other city in Texas offered the conditions that would have allowed for such a
trial to take place in the 1920s. Indeed, El Paso did care for its residents that were serving
overseas regardless if they were of Mexican ethnicity or not. That fact that the city‟s two local
newspapers constantly attempted to print current information on the whereabouts and conditions
of Company E showed just how important they were to El Paso. Moreover, the “Camp Gordon
Plan” laid the foundation for the strategy that was used by the Texas National Guard in forming
Company E. Specifically, by having them in a distinct unit of their own, the odds were that they
would be easier to train and Americanize as well. Lastly, one cannot forget Marcelino Serna and
others of Mexican ethnicity who served in World War I. Although small in number when
compared to the other minorities that served, their actions were enough to cause a major change
not just in how they were looked upon by others, but how they identified themselves.
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Recently, there has been more focus on Mexican-Americans on the home front during
World War II, especially with the assistance of distinct individuals such as Maggie RivasRodriguez. However, the field of study pertaining to Mexican-American military contributions is
still very much limited and more work is needed to be done. The hope is that it is not too late to
find these exceptional veterans and acquire their stories so that future generations will know of
their great accomplishments.
Overall, this study was inspired by the fact that there has never been a comprehensive
history of Company E. In a time when World War II veterans are quickly vanishing, this was a
story that needed to be chronicled so that the memory of Company E would not be forgotten.
Their uniqueness and contributions in the war are an important part of the history of El Paso, but
also to Mexican-American history in general. The only regrettable part of this research was that
other members of Company E could not be interviewed. At the time this study was made, only
Mr. Ricardo Palacios, Jr. was available for an interview. All of the other members of the unit had
either passed away or were in ill health. Although it is unfortunate to consider that within the
next two years there may no longer be any more members of Company E left, this study will
have narrated their experiences so that it will not be neglected from history.
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